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Preface 
GI/ITG KuVS Fachgespräch was organized on the topic of inter-vehicular 
communication. Discussions revolved around both the state of the art and around future directions 
of inter-vehicle communication research, from physical layer optimizations to novel applications 
of vehicular networks and from microscopic evaluation metrics to problems of scale, crime, and 
privacy. The goal of this new Fachgespräch was again to bring together talented young 
researchers to follow-up on the discussions.  
Over the last few years, significant efforts are being carried out by industry, academia 
and government agencies to improve driving safety, increase vehicle traffic efficiency and 
decrease fuel consumption by exploiting vehicular communications and networking technologies. 
These technologies, which are generally referred to as VANET (Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks), 
include Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications and can be 
based on short- and medium-range communications as well as on cellular systems. 
In February 2013 the first edition of the GI/ITG KuVS Fachgespräch was held in 
Innsbruck, Austria. Due to its success, the Fachgespräch was reorganized in February 2014, this 
time in Luxembourg City, Luxembourg. With more than 25 participants, the event was well 
attended. Young researchers have presented twelve papers on different topics around IVC. Every 
presentation was followed by a discussion leading to a dynamic interaction between the 
participants. In addition to an academic keynote held by Prof. Claudio Casetti, a VEINS tutorial 
has been organized. 
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DRIVE: An evaluation in a Closed Border
Environment
Markus Forster, Raphael Frank, Thomas Engel
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Abstract—In this short paper we address the problem of
abrupt breakdowns in traffic flow as a consequence of high traffic
demand in combination with small driver inaccuracies. First
we provide a brief overview on a Cooperative Advanced Driver
Assistance System (CADAS) called Density Redistribution through
Intelligent Velocity Estimation (DRIVE) that has been proposed
to mitigate jam formations. Next, we perform an analysis on the
traffic dynamics in a close border environment that enables us
to run simulations with well defined vehicular densities.
Keywords— Traffic Modeling, Vehicular Networks, Congested
Flow, Shock Waves
I. INTRODUCTION
Traffic demand has significantly increased over recent
decades. The traditional solution to face this problem has
been the extension of the road network by constructing new
roads or adding lanes to already existing ones. This strategy
however has come to a point where in most areas physical
road extensions are no longer possible [1]. As a possible
remedy, one should also consider the fact that, due to current
completely uncoordinated vehicular traffic, the already avail-
able capacity is not fully exploited. Simulations and empirical
analysis have shown that vehicular traffic is in free flow only
for relatively low densities when interactions between vehicles
are negligible [2].
To improve the current situation it is necessary to rely
on Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) systems that
equip vehicles with several sensors, enabling them to recognize
their surroundings and to notify motorists to take corrective
actions or, in some cases, to implement such corrections auto-
matically. An example of such a system is the Adaptive Cruise
Control (ACC) that can maintain minimum safety headway to
the vehicle ahead. Such systems can react much faster than
a human driver to sudden downstream vehicle maneuvers and
therefore allow to use smaller safety distances [3].
It has been until recently that researchers consider the flow
dynamics to increase the efficiency of Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC). In [4], the authors propose a strategy
to stabilize traffic flow by periodically beaconing relevant
traffic information to close-by vehicles. Vehicles that detect
perturbations downstream try to keep a larger gap to their
predecessor in order to compensate traffic inhomogeneity. They
show that at an equipment rate of 30% free flow can be restored
even at high traffic densities. An improvement of this work has
been proposed by the same authors in [5], where the model
includes the effect of the human reaction time, confirming the
previous findings.
In this paper we perform an analysis of a previous spec-
ified network protocol used within a Cooperative Advanced
Driver Assistance System (CADAS) that connects vehicles
via anVehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) and lets them
exchange recent and relevant traffic information.
The proposed DRIVE protocol [6] broadcasts with an event
driven messaging scheme critical information such as position
and velocity. This information can be used by following vehi-
cles far behind to learn about the traffic situation downstream.
This information is collected and evaluated in a way that
provides a consistent picture of the traffic situation ahead.
By using the Lighthill-Whitham-Richard model (LWR) [7],
[8], it is possible to estimate a density gradient between
two communicating vehicles and use this information for
velocity estimations. The aim of this protocol is to redistribute
oncoming vehicles in a way that prevents congestion shock
waves from forming. We show that, by giving individual ve-
locity recommendations, even with a low number of equipped
vehicles one can achieve significant improvements in overall
traffic flow and average travel times. Since this does not lead
to a reduction in safety distance, full system coverage is not
required to ensure collision-free driving.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The aim of the presented protocol is to improve vehicular
flow in situations of high traffic demand without requiring
excessive network resources. Furthermore, the protocol should
improve the overall traffic flow even with low equipment rates.
The flow improvement is achieved by the use of Density Redis-
tribution through Intelligent Velocity Redistribution (DRIVE).
For a full description of the protocol please refer to the original
paper [6].
In the next subsection we provide an overview of the
messaging mechanism of DRIVE. In the next but one subsec-
tion we provide a brief insight of the recommended velocity
estimation. Finally we demonstrate the execution of DRIVE
with an example.
A. Message propagation
The network protocol, used for communication of
DRIVE messages is fully compliant with the IEEE 802.11p
standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
(WAVE) [9], [10].
For our analysis, we assume channel characteristics as
listed in Table I. The protocol is divided into three main parts.
First part is the Message Dissemination, second part is the
Message Reception and the third part describes the Message
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Forwarding. A complete description of those three phases is
given in the next subsections.
TABLE I: Properties of radio channel
PHY 802.11p
Frequency 5.9 Hz
Maximum Sending Power 20 mW
Thermal Noise −110 dBm
Sensitivity −89 dBm
Signal Attenuation Threshold −89 dBm
MAC 1609_4
Transmission Power 20 mW
Bitrate 18 Mbps
Service Channel 2
1) Message Dissemination: DRIVE is an event driven
protocol, meaning that messages are only disseminated when
a certain event occurs. This implies that the WAVE beaconing
is not used in our analysis.
The event to trigger the dissemination of a DRIVE notifi-
cation is a significant slowdown or a unusually low velocity. A
slowdown is considered to be significant if the actual velocity
is 10 km/h lower than the velocity one second ago. Due to the
fact, that our protocol has been designed for highway scenarios
velocities lower than 50 km/h are considered as low velocities.
When detecting a slowdown event, an equipped vehicle
broadcasts a notification message containing the information:
mh = [id, x, y, t, v, TTL] (1)
where h ∈ H is a unique message identifier and id is a
unique identification of the originating vehicle. x and y are
the GPS-coordinates of the originator. The remaining values
are the timestamp of the originator at message creation (t), the
actual velocity of the originator at message creation (v) and a
preselected Time To Life (TTL).
2) Message Reception: The protocol will only check every
second if a relevant notification has been received. This implies
that messages arriving within this time interval ∆Tm have to
be precomputed and stored for further handling.
Vehicles receiving a message mj as given by the message
Specification 1 have to check first if this message is relevant
for them. This means, if no message has been received before,
within the current time interval the actual message will be
stored in a temporary variable mact. In case of the presence
of an older message the algorithm first has to find out if
the new message is more recent than the already stored
one. This is done by comparing the spatial distances of the
message originators to the receiver. This means that a vehicle i,
receiving a message mj will consider this message more recent
than message a mact if the spacial distance between vehicle i
and j is less than that between i and the vehicle originating
message mact, both vehicles are driving in the same direction
and vehicle j is ahead of vehicle i.
3) Message Forwarding: Each message received by a ve-
hicle with opposite driving direction will be rebroadcast if the
message has not been received before or the TTL is equal zero.
This is done to increase the sending range by using opposite
lane vehicles as relays.
In case of equal driving directions between sender j
and receiver i the message will only be rebroadcast if it is
considered recent (cf. Message Reception phase).
vj(1) = 25 m/s
vi(1) = 35 m/s
vi,safe(1) = 29 m/s
d∗i,j = 290 m c˜τ = 210 m
c˜ ≈ 15 km/h
Fig. 1: DRIVE Example
The message forwarding ends if the maximum propagation
radius is reached. Since patterns of a wave are recurrent,
the maximum message propagation distance has been set
to the maximum wavelength of a shock wave, in our case
2000 m [11].
B. Computation of Optimal Velocity
We assume that a driver always tries to drive as fast as
allowed by the traffic rules. Furthermore, we assume that the
only cause of a slow down is an increasing density the traffic
flow ahead. Then, having the information of the next known
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Fig. 2: Triangular fundamental diagram
vehicle in front, we estimate the unknown traffic situation
between the receiving vehicle i and the sending vehicle j by
applying the LWR model with the solution for the Transport
Equation:
c˜ =
Qj −Qi
ρj − ρi (2)
where Qj and Qi are the calculated traffic flows for vehicle j
and i, respectively. ρj and ρi denote the vehicular densities cor-
responding to the actual velocities. Based on this information,
it is possible to estimate the traffic conditions between vehicles
i and j. Obviously, only situations where the density at the
sender position ρj is greater than at receivers position ρi are
of interest. Next, we can compute a velocity recommendation
vi,safe:
vi,safe = vj +
d∗i,j − vjT
τ
(3)
d∗i,j = di,j + c˜τ (4)
τ =
di,j
∆vi,j
(5)
with di,j being the distance between vehicles j and i, ∆vi,j
being the velocity difference between vehicles i and j and τ
being the time for vehicle i to reach vehicle j with the given
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Fig. 3: Simulation results
velocity difference. vi,safe ensures that vehicle i will adapt its
velocity in a way not to hit the tail end of the shock wave
produced by vehicle j within the time τ . For more information
we refer the reader to [6].
C. DRIVE Example
An example of the DRIVE protocol is given in Figure 1.
Suppose, vehicle j experiences a slowdown from vj(0) =
35 m/s to vj(1) = 25 m/s. The onboard DRIVE equip-
ment broadcasts a message mh(j) = [id, xj , yj , t, vj , TTL]
according to the message given in Definition 1. A vehicle
i, receiving mh(j) and considering it as most recent event
notification, first checks if vj(1) < vi(1). If this holds true, the
densities ρj and ρi at position xj and xi are estimated. Having
an estimate of the densities and the measured values of the
velocities of both vehicles we can easily compute the density
gradient between them. In the given example and based on the
triangular fundamental diagram as given in Figure 2 this leads
to an approximated shock wave traveling with c˜ = −15 km/h
against traffic direction.
Knowing this, from Equations 3, 4 and 5 DRIVE computes
a safe velocity for vehicle i given by vi,safe(1) = 29 m/s in
order to avoid reaching the tail end of the shock wave produced
by vehicle j within the time τ as given by Equation 5, and
thus reducing the risk of a traffic perturbation.
III. PROTOCOL EVALUATION
In this section we describe the simulation setup and discuss
the obtained results.
Simulation Setup
All simulations presented in this paper have been per-
formed using the Veins framework [12]. Veins offers a
connection link between the two well-established simulators
Omnet++ [13] and SUMO [14]. With this setup we have
a bi-coupled network, meaning that the mobility simulation
interacts with the network simulation and vice versa.
The general simulation setup is an octagonal one lane
closed loop with an overall length of 10 km. A given number
of vehicles are driving around this loop counter clockwise for
2 hours. The mobility scenario is crash-free and specifies that
every driver tries to increase his speed up to the maximum
allowed velocity vmax = 130 km/h. Previous studies have
shown that after exceeding a certain density, the inefficiency of
human driving will lead to slow downs [7], [8]. To reproduce
this behavior with the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) [15]
used for our simulations, it is necessary to introduce a small
probabilistic factor. In our scenario this probability is set to
Pd = 1% meaning that a driver will reduce its current speed
by 1 m/s for 1 s with the given probability. Several simulation
runs have been performed with different vehicular densities
and different equipment rates. The aim is on the one hand
to show how DRIVE optimizes traffic flow and on the other
hand to provide an insight of the network characteristics of the
protocol.
The simulated densities ρ are given by the set R =
{1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60} vehicles per
km per lane. To provide a detailed overview on the DRIVE
protocol, four equipment rates, ranging from uncoordinated
(0%) over 10% and 50% to full coverage (100%) have been
simulated.
Simulation Results
In this section we discuss the simulation results. Four
different analyses with the above mentioned equipment rates
of the DRIVE system have been performed. The results show
the impact of DRIVE on traffic flow with vehicles that might
be equipped with a CACC but additionally takes into account
the effects of human behavior.
Figure 3a shows the average velocity over the given set
of densities R with the above mentioned equipment rates. As
expected, the average velocities are decreasing with increasing
density. However the DRIVE protocol alleviates this effect by
redistributing the vehicles in the system in a way that enables
them to drive with higher speeds. Between completely unco-
ordinated traffic and 100% equipment rate with the DRIVE
system, the average velocity can be increased by up to 25% in
the critical density region between 15 veh/km and 25 veh/km.
Figure 3b illustrates the average message hop-count. This
metric indicates how far messages travel backward in the traffic
chain or how often they have been forwarded. One can see that
with increasing density, the message travel distance increases
up to a certain point (40 veh/km). Beyond that density, most
vehicles are within transmission range reducing the message
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dissemination to one single hop.
These findings also agree with the results given in Fig-
ure 3c, where the average number of sent and forwarded
messages per vehicle per second is shown. For low densities
the ratio of send and forwarded messages is between 1 and 3
messages per vehicle per second. For higher equipment rates it
increases to 8 messages per vehicle per second for a density of
40 vehicles per km and then suddenly decreases. In agreement
with the trend shown in Figure 3b the communicating vehicles
are close enough that no message forwarding is needed to
reach all relevant vehicles. This means that the road is already
fully congested and that the traffic situation can no more be
improved.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this short paper we evaluate the performance of our
protocol Density Redistribution through Intelligent Velocity
Estimation (DRIVE) in a closed border environment. We
show that DRIVE allows to increase the average velocity
and therewith the vehicular throughput on a congested road.
Moreover we show that those improvements can be achieved
with only a few messages exchanged between the vehicles.
The redistribution of vehicles in terms of increasing the
distances between them has a positive effect on road safety
and driver convenience. Furthermore, the avoidance of pertur-
bations by a better distribution of the traffic demand results in
smoother traffic, reducing fuel consumption and emissions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to thank the National Research
Fund of Luxembourg (FNR) for providing financial support
through the CORE 2010 MOVE project (C10/IS/786097).
REFERENCES
[1] M. Shinkman, M. Buchanan, and E. I. U. G. Britain), Driving change:
how policymakers are using road charging to tackle congestion. The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006.
[2] B. Kerner, Introduction to Modern Traffic Flow Theory and Control.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[3] L. Davis, “Effect of adaptive cruise control systems on mixed traffic
flow near an on-ramp,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications, vol. 379, no. 1, pp. 274 – 290, 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378437106013690
[4] F. Knorr and M. Schreckenberg, “Influence of inter-vehicle communi-
cation on peak hour traffic flow,” Physica A Statistical Mechanics and
its Applications, vol. 391, pp. 2225–2231, Mar. 2012.
[5] F. Knorr, D. Baselt, M. Schreckenberg, and M. Mauve, “Reducing traffic
jams via vanets,” Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 61,
no. 8, pp. 3490–3498, 2012.
[6] M. Forster, R. Frank, M. Gerla, and T. Engel, “A cooperative advanced
driver assistance system to mitigate vehicular traffic shock waves,” in
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), April 2014, Toronto, CND,
2014 (to appear).
[7] M. Lighthill and G. Whitham, “On kinematic waves. II. A theory of
traffic flow on long crowded roads,” Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 229, no.
1178, pp. 317–345, 1955.
[8] P. Richards, “Shock Waves on the Highway,” Operations research,
vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 42–51, 1956.
[9] IEEE, 802.11-2012 - IEEE Standard for Information technology -
Telecommunications and information exchange between systems Local
and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements Part 11: Wire-
less LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[10] “Ieee draft standard for wireless access in vehicular environments
(wave) - networking services,” IEEE P1609.3/D8, August 2010, pp.
1–159, 2010.
[11] M. Treiber, A. Kesting, and D. Helbing, “Three-phase traffic theory and
two-phase models with a fundamental diagram in the light of empirical
stylized facts,” ArXiv e-prints, Apr. 2010.
[12] C. Sommer, R. German, and F. Dressler, “Bidirectionally Coupled
Network and Road Traffic Simulation for Improved IVC Analysis,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 3–15,
January 2011.
[13] A. Varga, “The omnet++ discrete event simulation system,” Proceedings
of the European Simulation Multiconference (ESM’2001), June 2001.
[14] M. Behrisch, L. Bieker, J. Erdmann, and D. Krajzewicz, “Sumo -
simulation of urban mobility: An overview,” in SIMUL 2011, The Third
International Conference on Advances in System Simulation, Barcelona,
Spain, October 2011, pp. 63–68.
[15] M. Treiber, A. Hennecke, and D. Helbing, “Congested traffic
states in empirical observations and microscopic simulations,” Phys.
Rev. E, vol. 62, pp. 1805–1824, Aug 2000. [Online]. Available:
http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevE.62.1805
8
Anonymous Credentials and Attribute-Based
Authorization Tickets in Car-to-X Communication
Carsten Büttner
Adam Opel AG
Advanced Technology
Rüsselsheim, Germany
carsten.buettner@de.opel.com
Sorin A. Huss
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Integrated Circuits and Systems Lab
Darmstadt, Germany
huss@iss.tu-darmstadt.de
Abstract—In this paper we propose an approach that allows
an ITS vehicle station (IVS) to anonymously authenticate itself at
applications with attribute-based access restrictions. For authen-
tication purposes we use attribute-based authorization tickets,
which are granted after the IVS proved, that it fulfills all access
restrictions. For the proof of attributes we rely on anonymous
credentials, which are sets of verified attributes. The resulting
system supports billing of service usage and revocation of an
IVS, tickets, anonymous credentials or single attributes, while
protecting the privacy of the IVS.
I. INTRODUCTION
In safety relevant communication over ETSI ITS-G5A [1]
an ITS Vehicle Station (IVS) authenticates itself by signing
all messages with the help of an Authorization Ticket (AT).
Besides these safety applications the IVS can also use non-
safety applications over ETSI ITS-G5B or cellular commu-
nication. To authenticate this kind of communication it is not
sufficient to sign all messages with the help of an AT for safety
applications, as some applications will have access restrictions.
A possible restriction could be for example, that the IVS is of a
specific brand or certain sensors or features have to be present.
Some Service Providers (SP) might also want to bill the IVS
for usage of their application.
In this paper we propose a system that relies on anonymous
credentials to issue attribute-based authorization tickets. Each
ticket can only be used for specific applications. An IVS
can take these tickets to anonymously authenticate itself at
applications with access restriction. If the application requires
billing, the IVS may pay with anonymous digital money. In
addition our system supports the revocation of an IVS, tickets,
anonymous credentials, or single attributes. We thus protect the
privacy of the IVS to the SP as well as to the other entities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II we discuss anonymous credentials. The entities used
in our system are described in Section III. Previous work in
authenticating an IVS in Car-to-X communication is reviewed
in Section IV. We introduce the new system with attribute-
based authorization tickets in V. In Section VI we discuss the
different kinds of possible revocation supported in our system.
Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. ANONYMOUS CREDENTIALS
In an anonymous credential system, introduced by
Chaum [2], an issuer provides credentials to users, whereas
a credential denotes a set of attributes certified by the issuer.
An attribute consists of a key (e.g., brand) and a value (e.g.,
Opel). With this credential the user can prove to a verifier that
he or she possesses certain attributes certified in the credential.
To convince the verifier, she derives a token that only contains
the subset of attributes she wants to prove. So, the verifier
learns only the necessary attributes of the user. A user can
also prove that the content of a ciphertext produced for a third
party is the value of a certain attribute without revealing the
attribute to the verifier. Several proofs of the same attributes
cannot be linked, because each time another token is being
derived. It is possible to prove predicates like or, and, greater
than, smaller than and equals over the attributes.
Possible attributes for an IVS are brand or production date
and features like traffic sign recognition, electric engine or
Bluetooth.
As an example, Equation 1 shows how it is possible to
check if an IVS is manufactured by GM, without leaking the
brand of the IVS. This is realized by checking for all GM
brands, if the attribute brand equals to the name of the brand.
The derived token then indicates, if the equation is true or false
and so reveals only the manufacturer and not the brand to the
verifier.
brand = ”Opel”∨ brand = ”Chevrolet”∨ brand = ... (1)
Equation 2 can be used to prove that an IVS is not older
than x days. From the result a verifier learns, that the IVS is
manufactured less than x days ago but not the exact date.
production_date > today − x (2)
III. ENTITIES
We use the following entities in our system to obtain
attribute-based certificates:
Root CA: The Root Certification Authority (CA) is the
trust anchor of the system. It certifies the Enrolment and
Authorization Authorities. Every IVS in the system has to trust
the Root CA in order to trust the other entities.
IVS Enrolment Authority: The IVS Enrolment Authority
(IVS EA) issues the Enrolment Certificate (EC) and credential
to the IVS. In order to issue credentials, the IVS EA has a
database with all attributes of all ITS Vehicle Stations it is
responsible for.
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Fig. 1. Request and usage of the Enrolment Certificate and authorization
tickets
IVS Authorization Authority: The IVS Authorization Au-
thority (IVS AA) issues authorization tickets to an IVS, after
it has checked the eligibility. The AT allows an IVS to use the
application specified in the ticket.
SP Enrolment Authority: The Service Provider Enrolment
Authority (SP EA) issues Enrolment Certificates to SPs.
Bank: The bank is a central entity which issues digital
money. This money can be used to purchase an AT at the
IVS AA in order to get access to an application.
Service Provider: Each Service Provider has an EC issued
by the Service Provider Enrolment Authority to prove it is an
authorized SP in the system. An SP can provide one or several
applications to an IVS. Applications can have the condition
that the IVS using it must have certain attributes like of a
specific brand or presence of a certain sensor. An SP can also
have its own IVS Authorization Authority, which is then used
instead of the global one.
ITS Vehicle Station: An IVS requests an EC and credential,
containing its attributes from the IVS EA. Later on, it uses
them to obtain authorization tickets from the IVS AA. The ITS
Vehicle Station proves its eligibility for using an application
by showing the AT to the Service Provider.
IV. PREVIOUS WORK
The process to request Enrolment Credentials and au-
thentication tickets for safety applications is standardized by
ETSI [3]. It gives an IVS the possibility to request ATs from an
IVS AA in order to send safety relevant messages over ETSI
ITS-G5A. To request ATs, an IVS has to obtain an EC first.
Figure 1 shows the single steps which an IVS must complete
prior to sending safety relevant messages. In the following
these steps are presented in more detail.
A. Enrolment Certificate Request
First, the ITS Vehicle Station has to request an Enrolment
Certificate from the IVS Enrolment Authority. This is done
in Step IV.A1, where the IVS sends an encrypted and signed
message with its canonical certificate together with a certificate
request to the IVS EA.
EncIV S_EA(SigIV S(canonical cert., cert. request))
(IV.A1)
Then, the IVS EA validates the request and responses
with the encrypted EC (Step IV.A2). After reception, the IVS
encrypts, validates, and stores the EC.
EncEC(EC) (IV.A2)
B. Authorization Tickets Request
There are two different ways an IVS can obtain autho-
rization tickets from the IVS AA. One was developed by the
Car-to-Car Communication Consortium [4] and the other has
been standardized by ETSI [3]. In this paper we only discuss
the former one, as our concept can be seen as an extension.
After an IVS received its Enrolment Certificate, the IVS
then requests authorization tickets at the IVS Authorization
Authority as illustrated in Figure 1. To request ATs, the IVS
creates key-pairs to validate, signs the Public Keys (PKs),
encrypts the signature and the EC for the IVS EA, and sends
the PKs together with both the encrypted signature and the EC
to the IVS AA (Step IV.B1).
PKs,EncIV S_EA(SigEC(PKs), EC) (IV.B1)
Upon reception the IVS AA calculates the hash of the pub-
lic keys and sends the hash value together with the encrypted
EC and signature, to the IVS EA (Step IV.B2).
H(PKs), EncIV S_EA(SigEC(PKs), EC) (IV.B2)
Next, the IVS EA decrypts the EC and the signature and
validates them (Step IV.B3) and then sends the result to the
IVS AA (Step IV.B4).
OK or FAIL (IV.B4)
If the result is positive, then the IVS AA finally issues the
ATs to the IVS (Step IV.B5). Otherwise, an error is returned.
ATs or error (IV.B5)
C. Authorization Tickets Usage
After the ITS Vehicle Station received its authorization
tickets, it can start broadcasting signed messages for safety
applications over ETSI ITS G5A. This is shown by Step IV.C1
in Figure 1. When the validation period of the ATs is over, the
IVS has to request new tickets from the IVS Authorization
Authority.
V. AUTHENTICATION
In the following, we detail the steps which are necessary
for an ITS Vehicle Station to authenticate itself in order to
contact a Service Provider featuring access restrictions.
A. Enrolment Certificate and Credential Request
First, the IVS must obtain an Enrolment Certificate and cre-
dential from the IVS Enrolment Authority, which is illustrated
in Figure 2. The EC is a certificate to prove, that the IVS is
an authorized ITS station. It is the same Enrolment Certificate
as in the previous work [3]. The credential is a certification
of the attributes of the ITS Vehicle Station. To get an EC and
credential, the IVS sends in Step V.A1 an encrypted and signed
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(V.A2)
(V.B1)
(V.B2)
Fig. 2. Request of the Enrolment Certificate, credential and money
message with its canonical certificate and a certificate request
to the IVS EA.
EncIV S_EA(SigIV S(canonical cert., cert. request))
(V.A1)
Then, the IVS EA validates the request, issues the EC and
credential, and sends them encrypted to the IVS (Step V.A2).
After reception, the IVS encrypts, validates, and stores them.
EncEC(EC,Credential) (V.A2)
B. Money Request
After the IVS received its EC and credential, it can request
digital money from the bank as illustrated in Figure 2. This
can be done multiple times. Blind signatures can be used
for digital money [5]. If blind signatures are used, the IVS
generates random values, blinds them, and sends the blinded
values together with its authorization to the bank in order to
request digital money (Step V.B1). The bank then blindly signs
the values, debits the bank account of the driver, and returns
the blind signed values back to the IVS (Step V.B2).
blinded_values, auth_info (V.B1)
digital_money (V.B2)
The IVS now has digital money from the bank, which can
be used to pay for applications.
C. Attribute-Based Authorization Ticket Request
The ITS Vehicle Station can now request attribute-based
authorization tickets to use specific applications, with the help
of its Enrolment Certificate, credential and, if necessary, the
digital money from the IVS Authorization Authority. When
requesting attribute-based ATs, the IVS first checks if the
attributes necessary for the application are present as illustrated
in Figure 3 (Step V.C1).
Now, the IVS encrypts the hash of its EC for the IVS
EA. Then it derives a token containing the necessary attributes
and a proof for the ciphertext. Afterwards it creates the key
pairs to sign. Now it signs the name of the application and
the public keys to certify. This signature is then, together with
Root CA
IVS Authorization
Authority
SP
SP Enrolment
Authority
IVS
IVS Enrolment
Authority
(V.C1)
(V.C8)
(V.C3)
(V.C4)
(V.C5)
(V.C6)
(V.C7)
(V.C2)
Bank
Fig. 3. Request of attribute-based authorization tickets
the EC, encrypted for the IVS EA. Finally, the IVS sends the
application name, the encrypted parts, the token, the PKs, and
the necessary money to the IVS AA (Step V.C2).
app_name,EncIV S_EA(SigEC(app_name, PKs), EC),
EncIV S_EA(hash), tokenattr+hash, PKs, digital_money
(V.C2)
On reception, the IVS AA validates the token and sends
the encrypted parts together with a hash over the application
name and the public keys to the IVS EA (Step V.C3).
H(app_name, PKs), EncIV S_EA(hash),
EncIV S_EA(SigEC(app_name, PKs), EC)
(V.C3)
The IVS EA encrypts everything and checks in Step V.C4
if the EC and the signature are valid and if the hash fits this
EC. Afterwards, the IVS EA returns the result of this validation
to the IVS AA. (Step V.C5)
OK or FAIL (V.C5)
If the validation was successful and the IVS has to pay for
the application usage, the IVS AA forwards the digital money
from the IVS to the bank (Step V.C6). There the money is
transfered to the the account of the IVS Authorization Au-
thority. Subsequently, the bank returns the validity information
(Step V.C7).
digital_money (V.C6)
OK or FAIL (V.C7)
Finally, the IVS AA issues the attribute-based authorization
tickets for the application to the IVS (Step V.C8), if all
previous steps were executed successfully. Otherwise an error
is transmitted.
ATsapp_name or error (V.C8)
The outlined system supports two different kinds of billing
- per request or per time period. If the IVS has to pay per
request, each AT can be used for one request only. When the
IVS uses an AT to access an application, the AT is revoked
immediately at the SP to prevent further usage. The IVS gets
as many ATs as it has payed for. When per time period billing
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Fig. 4. Application usage
is used, the IVS gets authorization tickets, which are only valid
in the time period it payed for.
When the SP registers its applications at the IVS AA, it
has to provide the necessary attributes, billing information, etc.
to the IVS AA. It is possible that each SP has its own IVS
AA. However, this affects the privacy of the SP, because the
SP can now link the ATs to the IVS.
D. Application Usage
When the IVS successfully requested ATs from the IVS
AA, it can start using the application with the issued tickets
as illustrated in Figure 4.
VI. REVOCATION
There are different kinds of revocation the system should
support. It needs to revoke a whole IVS from participating
in the system as well as single ATs, the whole credential or
a single attribute of an IVS. In the following these cases are
discussed.
A. ITS Vehicle Station
To exclude an ITS Vehicle Station, the IVS Enrolment
Authority has to revoke the Enrolment Certificate of the IVS.
Then the IVS can no longer get new authorization tickets
from the IVS AA, since the EC is checked each time ATs
are requested. There is no difference in comparison to the
revocation of an IVS in previous work.
B. Authorization Tickets
If a Service Provider wants to revoke a single authorization
ticket for its application, the SP can revoke it by himself.
The SP can locally mark it as invalid, since each application
has its own ATs, which are only valid for this application.
If the ATs are also used in application specific Car-to-Car
communication, the SP can distribute Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) to its clients. If an AT was issued by accident,
the IVS AA can report this AT to the SP so it can be revoked.
C. Anonymous Credential
The revocation of the credential of an IVS can be done by
the IVS EA like the revocation of the EC, since upon each
request the IVS EA is asked if the credential is still valid.
D. Attribute
To revoke a single attribute of an IVS, it is necessary to
have some kind of misbehavior detection, since it is necessary
to detect which attributes are no longer valid. There may be
a central entity which collects misbehavior reports, containing
the AT and in which manner the IVS misbehaved from the
SPs and triggers the revocation process.
Like in the ETSI ITS-G5A communication, the identity of
the holder of an AT can be revealed by a cooperation of the
IVS EA and IVS AA. Then the IVS EA can mark the current
credential of the IVS as invalid. The next time the IVS tries
to request a new AT for an application, the IVS EA can detect
that the credential is no longer valid and triggers the IVS to
request a new credential. The new credential can have less or
other attributes, according to the misbehavior of the IVS.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed an approach aimed to allow
Service Providers to specify attributes an ITS Vehicle Station
must have in order to use its applications. An IVS can
prove to the IVS Authorization Authority, which is issuing
attribute-based authorization tickets for applications, that it
has the necessary attributes to exploit the application, without
revealing the attributes not necessary for this purpose. Then
the IVS can use its ATs to prove the SP that it is eligible to
use them, but without revealing the real identity. We assume
a central billing entity, which supports request and time based
billing. Since all applications can use this billing service,
applications do not need to implement their own billing.
The presented approach supports a revokation of the IVS,
single ATs, the credential of an IVS or even single attributes
of the credential. Also, the system preserves the privacy of the
IVS against the SPs and IVS AA, since they know only that the
IVS possesses the necessary attributes and not necessarily the
identity of the IVS. The IVS Enrolment Authority is aware
of the identity and all attributes of the IVS, but not which
application is being exercised. The billing service knows real
data about the IVS like its bank account, but not its EC,
credential or which application it is using.
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Abstract—Electric vehicles are believed to soon play an im-
portant role in urban traffic. In order to fully understand their
performance in terms of range and battery management large-
scale simulations can offer valuable insights. In this work we
present a simulation framework to study these and other aspects
of future mobility.
We develop a computationally inexpensive battery and energy
consumption model that accounts for rolling and air resistances
and only requires preset constant parameters and speed updates
of a vehicle to compute the battery’s State of Charge. We
furthermore show that—based on real map data—it is possible to
conduct city-scale simulations with 100 000 vehicles to investigate
a wide range of effects considering an increasing proportion of
electric vehicles. Finally, the framework also allows to investigate
battery management strategies which are based upon inter-
vehicle communication.
Index Terms—Electromobility; IVC; lithium-ion battery model
I. INTRODUCTION
The absence of direct CO2 emission makes electric vehicles
a promising approach to lower pollution and reduce the CO2
footprint. Therefore, the German Government released plans
to increase the number of electric vehicles on German roads
to 1 million by the year 2020 [1]. To reach this goal, the
main challenge for electric vehicles has to be overcome: their
limited range. One approach is to use rechargeable lithium-ion
batteries; given a high energy density and low self-discharge
rate, they can boost the effectiveness and thereby the popularity
of electric cars. Unfortunately, the performance of lithium-
ion batteries deteriorates over time [2], caused by age and
the number of charge cycles. One possible solution for this
problem is advanced battery management [3].
Fully understanding the effects of different management
strategies from Field Operational Test (FOT) is a cost-intensive
and time-consuming approach. Large-scale simulations offer
a promising solution to this problem, however, they require
realistic traffic and battery models in order to produce meaning-
ful results. Especially when battery management includes the
utilization of inter-vehicle communication [3], a comprehensive
simulation framework can help predict the batteries’ behavior
under numerous conditions and to find approaches for extending
the batteries’ life-times.
In this paper, we present our work towards such a framework.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We present a computationally efficient battery and energy
consumption model that only requires preset engine
parameters and data obtained by a microscopic traffic
simulator
• We show how to conduct city-scale traffic simulation
using SUMO and the OMNeT++ simulator to examine
(potentially aided by wireless communication) battery
management strategies.
• We discuss possible directions where inter-vehicular
communication can help extend battery life-time.
II. RELATED WORK
Lithium-ion battery modeling has been subject to numerous
studies.
The authors of [4] present a behavioral lithium-ion battery
model in a general sense without going into kinematic details.
They discuss the dependency of the battery discharge capacity
on the discharge rate and temperature. In [3] Tielert et al.
analyse how ambient temperature, road gradient, auxiliary
consumers and driver behavior impact the energy consumption
of electric vehicles [3]. They study how vehicular networks, in
particular traffic-light-to-vehicle communication, can decrease
battery energy consumption and find that electric cars could
profit from longer information distances. By doubling the
information distance from 300m to 600m up to tripled battery
energy savings were observed.
Using the presented battery model, we aim to further
investigate the possibilities of wireless communication in city-
scale simulations. In this work we perform the simulation of
electric vehicles on city roads, implement a battery module and
build it in our simulation setup. This enables us to evaluate
the traffic flow, vehicular networks and the impact of different
factors on the battery State of Charge (SOC) simultaneously.
III. BATTERY MODEL
This section describes our computationally inexpensive
battery and energy consumption model that only requires preset
engine parameters and that can operate solely on vehicles
speeds, for example obtained by a microscopic traffic simulator.
At this stage the model of lithium-ion battery is temperature
independent and does not account for battery recuperation or
road gradients. These extensions are subject of future work.
In each time step of the traffic simulation, the SOC is
computed as a function of the vehicle speed ~v, the acceleration
~a and the angular speed of the wheels ~wR (see Figure 1).
However, given only ~v, the acceleration ~a is found as a rate
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Figure 1. Battery model: State of Charge (SOC) in relation to the vehicle
speed
of change of the vehicle speed compared to the last time
step. Furthermore, the angular speed of the wheels ~wR and
consequently, the motor’s angular speed ~wM can be derived.
The motor power PM in relation to the number of revolutions
per minute n and torque M is specific to the type of vehicle
and was provided by AUDI AG for this research.
The power of the battery PB and current IB can be calculated
based on the motor efficiency ηM according to [5]:
PB =
PM + PR + PA
ηM
, (1)
where PR and PA denote the rolling and air resistance,
respectively.
Assuming that the battery voltage UB is constant, IB can
be calculated as follows:
IB =
PB
UB
. (2)
Finally, using the battery capacity CN , SOC is approximated
by Equation (3):
SOC =
t1∫
t0
IB(t)dt
CN
. (3)
This formula serves as rough approximation since it assumes
that current and temperature correction factors are both equal
to one [4].
IV. SIMULATION MODEL
In order to assess the performance and the impact on energy
consumption of electric vehicles in an urban environment, we
extend the Veins framework [6] accordingly. Veins couples the
network simulator OMNeT++ [7] and the microscopic traffic
simulator SUMO [8]. We chose OMNeT++ to be able to later
introduce inter-vehicular communication as a possible battery
management strategy.
With the help of MATLAB we generate the input for the
Urban Driving Cycles as defined in the New European Driving
Cycle (NEDC) [9] for a single vehicle and use this to validate
our model implemented in OMNeT++.
A. Implementation
To allow for the independent computation and monitoring
of the SOC for each vehicle, we extended them to maintain
an instance of our rechargeable lithium-ion battery model
(Figure 2a).
Our simulation further allows the deployment of charging
stations, which are maintained by a manager module (Figure 2b).
This module reads parameters such as position and capacity
from an XML file and creates charging station modules at
run-time.
(a) Car battery module is
built in the car NED file
(b) Highway NED file includes
charging station manager module
Figure 2. OMNeT++ Implementation
In a proof of concept simulation, an electric vehicle will
choose the closest free charging station when its SOC is below
a certain threshold. The vehicle is then rerouted to the charging
station and will recharge until the battery is full. The vehicle
will then proceed to its original destination.
B. Simulation of Nuremberg Road Traffic
The meaningfulness of a simulation heavily relies on the
correctness of the used models [10]. It is therefore of
high importance to simulate realistic traffic in order to draw
conclusions on the performance of electric vehicles.
According to the Nuremberg transport statistics for 2011
there are 227,482 registered passenger cars [11]. For simplicity
we carry out the simulation of the city of Nuremberg (see
Figure 3) with 100 000 vehicles on a PC with quad-core CPU,
whose maximal speed and cache are 3.5 GHz and 10 MB,
respectively.
Figure 3. Map of the city of Nuremberg in SUMO
The simulation time step is set to 1 s and vehicle parameters
possess default values. The resulting simulation runtime is
approximately 22 minutes, whereas in real life the duration
exceeds 27 hours.
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To also investigate the performance of electric vehicles, we
started by simulating one electric vehicle in a smaller section
of the map (see Figure 4). The distance between the start and
destination points of the route is about 3.5 km. We placed two
charging stations in close proximity to the chosen route.
One possible outcome of such simulations is an approxima-
tion of the optimal positioning of charging stations. In a first
step we assume that regular gas stations are also equipped with
plug charging connectors for electric cars. This allows us to
draw conclusions whether (and how many) additional charging
stations are required considering a desired maximum waiting
time.
Figure 4. Individually simulated electric vehicle on the Nuremberg map
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Figure 5 shows an example SOC curve of an individually
simulated electric vehicle on the Nuremberg map. It can be
seen that after 377 s with an average speed of 10.8 m/s and
a top speed of 14 m/s the SOC is reduced by less than 7 %
(corresponding to 0.84 kW h).
To prove the correctness of our OMNeT++ model we used
the SUMO mobility trace as an input to the MATLAB model.
The comparison of the SOC behavior in Veins and MATLAB
simulation models shows no difference.
Figure 5. Speed and State of Charge of one individually simulated electric
vehicle
In a second simulation, we use our battery model to simulate
a typical urban driving cycle as defined by the NEDC [9].
Figure 6 can be seen as a benchmark for the comparison against
other battery models and to investigate the effect of future
features such as recuperation and temperature dependency. It
Figure 6. Speed, energy consumption and state of charge of a vehicle’s run
through the NEDC
also allows us to validate our model based on data from real
experiments. We observe that after 780 s and a covered distance
of 4067 m the battery is drained by less than 7 %.
VI. INTER-VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION
The communication among vehicles and between vehicles
and infrastructure can be a promising tool to further reduce
battery drain and thereby increase the range of electric vehi-
cles. For example, Green Light Optimized Speed Advisory
systems [4], [12] and vehicular communication based on IEEE
802.11p [13] and/or UMTS/LTE cannot only be used to avoid
unnecessary stops but also to choose an optimal recuperation
stage to obtain the best possible energy gain.
But also other vehicles can provide valuable information:
for example, a car driving ahead can inform the electric vehicle
about its deceleration rate or planned lane changes to avoid
an energetic suboptimal driving maneuver and again aid in
choosing the correct recuperation stage.
Vehicular networks can also be helpful in reducing the
waiting times at charging stations for electric cars. Receiving
information about the location and current occupancy of
charging stations could enable drivers of electric vehicles to
reserve a spot at the most suitable charging station in advance.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we introduce a computationally inexpensive
lithium-ion battery and energy consumption model which
considers rolling and air resistance and is only based on
predefined engine parameters and speed of a vehicle. We
presented a simulation model, which is used to simulate
electric vehicles in the city of Nuremberg and investigate their
performance together with their impact on energy consumption.
The simulation results show that the developed model can be
used to further study the performance of electric vehicles under
certain conditions.
Future work will concentrate on extending model to also
account for recuperation as well as the influence of ambient
temperature. Furthermore we will focus on the simulation of
realistic city-wide traffic based on empiric data to evaluate
the impact of the substitution of common combustion engine
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vehicles with their electric counterparts. Based on these steps,
we will then investigate possible benefits of inter-vehicular
communication on battery management.
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Abstract—The number of electronic control units in today’s
cars is permanently increasing. As the demand for information
exchange between these units is also increasing, the complexity
of the in-car communication infrastructure also increases. In the
past more and more bus-segments have been added to cope with
the growing demands. In order to reduce the complexity and
the costs for the future in-car communication infrastructure,
the approach of using power line communication for the in-
car communication has been analyzed. By using power line
communication, the cabling can be reduced to the minimum.
In this paper the challenges of today’s and the requirement for
future in-car systems are summarized. The HomePlug Green
PHY standard, which has been designed for smart grid applica-
tions, will be analyzed according to its applicability to the in-car
communication. A proposal and its evaluation for the reduction
of the overhead will be presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades the demand for information exchange
between ECUs (electronic control units) in vehicles rapidly
raised. Prior to the digital data transmission, mainly electrical
signals have been used for the information exchange. With
the increasing number of safety and comfort functions, the
demand for a data exchange between a huge number of
ECUs increases from vehicle generation to vehicle generation.
Over the years different communication systems emerged for
different applications.
In the 1980s the CAN-bus (controller area network) [1]
has been designed and released. The CAN bus was one of the
first widely spread communication busses in vehicles. With an
increase in body and comfort functions, the wish for a cheap
and simple communication system came up. For this purpose
the LIN-bus (local interconnect network) [2] has been defined.
It is mainly used for the body and comfort functions where
safety requirements are typically low and no high data rates
are needed. In the beginning of the 21 century the requirement
for a new in-car communication system came up. FlexRay
[3] has been designed to provide a communication system for
time-critical functions like safety functions.
In a today’s upper class vehicle more than 40-50 of
these communication busses can be found. This introduces
challenges in planning, deployment and the maintenance of
the harness. Additionally the high number of wires lead to
higher costs and also weight, which directly translates in fuel
consumption.
The highest rate of changes is typically observed in the
body and comfort area, where the LIN-bus is dominant. Upper
class vehicles already contain up to 20-30 of these busses
distributed over the whole vehicle. If information has to be
transmitted to another LIN-bus, gateways have to be used.
One possibility to reduce the cabling of the ECUs is the
usage of wireless communication. But with wireless commu-
nication additional challenges arise. The interference to and
from other devices in the surrounding of the vehicle have to
be considered. Measurements [4] have shown, that the effective
area of influence is quite large. The positioning of the antenna
has to be chosen carefully and the transmit power should be
as low as possible.
Another possibility is the application of power line com-
munication (PLC). With PLC the need for dedicated commu-
nication lines besides the power line disappears. Thereby the
cabling will be reduced to the minimum - the power supply.
Measurements [5] have shown, that the physical transmission
of PLC signals on a car body is possible. But the EMC still has
to be investigated in order to meet automotive requirements.
Various PLC standards for the in-house application like
G.hn or HomePlug AV are available. The latter one has
been investigated according to its applicability for the in-car
communication.
In this paper, starting from a today’s vehicle, the challenges
and requirements for the future in-car communication will be
stated. The HomePlug Green PHY standard will be examined
according to its applicability for the in-car communication.
In section II a short overview on a today’s in-car communi-
cation infrastructure will be given. In Section III requirements
for a future in-car PLC communication protocol will be
listed. Section IV will summarize the main features of the
HomePlug Green PHY standard and its applicability for the in-
car communication will be discussed. In section V simulation
results with a modified protocol are presented. A conclusion
will be given in section VI.
II. TODAY’S IN-CAR COMMUNICATION
[Final paper content: Overview on the in-car commu-
nication infrastructure, commonly used bus-systems]
Today’s cars include highly interconnected ECUs covering
a wide rage of applications. Upper class vehicles - depending
on the configuration of the features - may contain up to 50-
100 ECUs. Besides these ECUs there are also sensors and
actuators, which have to be connected. The cabling needed for
the interconnection of the ECUs easily reaches summed up
length of more than 1-2 km. Widely spread bus-systems which
can be found in such a vehicle are: CAN, LIN and FlexRay.
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Multiple busses of each type are typically deployed in a car
and most of them are interconnected by a gateway. As a high
rate of change from vehicle generation to vehicle generation is
in the body and comfort area where the LIN-bus is dominant,
the focus of this paper is to replace the LIN-infrastructure
by a PLC-system. The low safety-requirements on the LIN-
bus are another reason for choosing its replacement in a first
realization.
The LIN-bus is a comparatively cheap bus-system mostly
used for non safety-critical communication in the body and
comfort domain. The maximum data rate is 20 kbit/s. How-
ever the possible savings of replacing the LIN-infrastructure by
PLC is quite high, because of the high number of LIN-busses
in a car covering almost every part of the vehicle. A today’s
upper class vehicle already includes over 20 LIN-busses, which
comes along with a very high effort in wiring.
The high number of LIN-busses lead to various challenges.
The increasing complexity enlarges the effort in planning,
installation, management and the diagnosis of the harness. The
weight is also increasing which directly translates into a higher
fuel consumption.
III. PLC FOR THE IN-CAR COMMUNICATION
[Final paper content: PLC protocol requirements for
the future in-car communication infrastructure]
The requirements for the in-car communication differ from
typical home area networks (HANs). Typical HANs consist of
a small number of nodes interconnected by a network with
comparably high data rate. For a high throughput, the frames
typically carry some hundred bytes in order to reduce the
overhead. For the in-car communication in contrast, a high
number of nodes has to be connected while the exchanged
information is typically in the range of only 1-8 byte. Thus
a protocol for the in-car communication should be able to
support a high number of nodes while minimizing the overhead
for the short payloads.
Most protocols for the home and wide area networks
are non-deterministic. Regarding diagnosis, determinism is a
desirable property for in-car communication systems.
Another point is the quality of service (QoS). Most proto-
cols support a kind of QoS but for the in-car communication
some functions have strict requirements regarding the latency.
Functions like control loops often produce periodic traffic
either continuously or at least for a period of time.
Thus a protocol should be suitable to transport periodic
traffic on the one hand and support event based traffic on the
other hand.
The requirements for a in-car communication system can
roughly be summarized as follows:
• Scalability: The protocol has to be able to handle a
high number of nodes (one hundred or even more)
• The overhead has to be minimized; in case of the LIN-
bus the payload will be less or equal to 8 byte
• Determinism is a desired feature (at least for periodic
traffic)
TABLE I. HOMEPLUG GREEN PHY ROBO MODES
mode PHY rate # copies PHY block
Mini-ROBO 3.8 Mbit/s 5 PB136
Standard-ROBO 4.9 Mbit/s 4 PB520
High Speed ROBO 9.8 Mbit/s 2 PB520
• Support for periodic traffic and additionally support
for event based traffic
IV. IEEE 1901 AND HOMEPLUG GREEN PHY
[Final paper content: Short introduction in IEEE 1901
and the HomePlug standard, protocol overhead when
using the HomePlug Green PHY standard, solution to
reduce the overhead by using the frame control for frame
transmission]
The IEEE 1901 standard [6] has been defined to provide
coexistence between different PLC standards. Thus IEEE 1901
includes the HomePlug standard. In the following a brief
overview on the HomePlug standard will be given.
The HomePlug 1.0 standard has been released in 2001
by the HomePlug Alliance. HomePlug AV as an extension
has been released in 2005. HomePlug AV currently supports
data rates up to 500 Mbit/s. The new HomePlug AV2 standard
already supports data rates of approximately 1 Gbit/s.
For Smart Grid applications the HomePlug Green PHY
(HP GP) standard has also been released in 2005. HomePlug
Green PHY is a subset of the HomePlug AV standard with the
focus on a robust communication. The robustness is reached by
using only QPSK modulation and using the so-called ROBO
(robust) modes. With the ROBO modes multiple copies of the
same signal are simultaneously transmitted over the OFDM
(orthogonal frequency division multiplex) carriers.
For the organization and synchronization of a network one
node is selected to act as a central coordinator (CCo). The
CCo periodically sends beacons to synchronize the network.
In between beacons two medium access methods can be used.
The first one is the mandatory CSMA which uses a backoff-
mechanism for collision avoidance. The optional TDMA is the
second access method. In the TDMA access period, stations
can ask the CCo for a reservation of transmission time.
As a dynamic reservation of transmission time according
to the HomePlug AV standard is not a suitable solution for the
in-car communication, only CSMA is considered in this paper.
In table I, the HomePlug Green PHY ROBO modes are
listed. In the last column the physical block size is shown.
PB136 denotes a physical block with 136 byte length, PB520
corresponds to a physical block with 520 byte in length. These
PBs are the smallest amount of data which will be transmitted
on the channel. Each PB consists of a PB header and a PB
check sequence (each 4 byte in length). For a PB136 this leads
to a PB payload (PB body) of 128 byte. In this payload the
MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) is transported. A MAC frame
consists of a 2 byte header and a 4 byte checksum. In the case
of a PB136 this leads to a MAC payload of 122 byte.
Considering typical in-car frame length of up to 8 byte,
even the usage of the smallest PHY block size of 136 byte
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Preamble Frame control Data 1 Data 2
Fig. 1. HomPlug Green PHY PPDU structure
introduces a huge overhead. In addition there is an overhead
for the CSMA/CA medium access (backoff, interframe spaces
and acknowledgments).
The physical transmission unit is depicted in figure 1. A
preamble is sent out, followed by a frame control (FC), which
is either one or two OFDM symbols in length. After the FC
the OFDM data symbols are sent out which carry one or more
PHY blocks. The FC has got different tasks. The delimiter
type field of the FC identifies the content of the data symbols
(e.g. data or acknowledgment frame).
One option to reduce the overhead introduced by the size of
the PHY blocks could be the definition of shorter PHY blocks.
The length of one block could be chosen to fit into one OFDM
symbol, thus reducing the transmission time. A drawback of
this option is the fact, that this will break the current standard.
In protocol design when defining headers, a common way
is to reserve fields or IDs for future extensions. In other cases,
fields designed for a specific function are later on used for
a different purpose. One example is the Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECT), which is an extension to the IP- and
TCP-protocol. ECT is used for the end-to-end notification of
network congestion and it uses 2 bit of the type of service
(TOS) field in the corresponding header.
Another option to reduce the overhead will be described
in the following. The IEEE 1901 standard defines two MPDU
frame formats. The long MPDU consists of the frame control
with a following MPDU payload, which is transported in the
OFDM data symbols as illustrated in Fig. 1. The short MPDU
in contrast only consists of the frame contol. One example
for a short MPDU is the acknowledgement indicated by a
corresponding value in the delimiter type field.
When having a look at the frame control fields, two
delimiter types can be found as currently unused. In addition
there is a variant field whose type of content is indicated by
the delimiter type. One of the currently unused delimiter types
could be used to identify the transmission of a payload in the
variant field. The variant field in the FC is 96 bit in length. This
is enough to transport a LIN payload of 8 byte plus additional
management information like an address.
The transmission time for one frame with a PB136 is
353.08µs (including the transmission of the preamble, frame
control and data symbols for the transmission of the PB136).
When transmitting the payload in the frame control, the
transmission time can be shortened to 110.48µs (transmission
time of preamble plus frame control). But this is only the
transmission time of the payload. Additional protocol overhead
such as the backoff, interframe spaces and the transmission of
the acknowledgement has to be considered.
V. SIMULATIONS WITH THE MODIFIED PROTOCOL
[Final paper content: Explanation of the simulation
setup, simulation results with the transmission of the
payload in the frame control; graphs with simulation
results will be reworked]
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Fig. 2. Simulation results for priority CA1 [will be reworked in the final
paper]
In order to investigate the performance of the protocol,
simulations have been carried out. A framework for the
OMNeT++ network simulator has been created which supports
the IEEE 1901 standard. The simulation has been modified for
the payload transmission in the frame control. The simulation
setup consists of a network of 100 nodes. All nodes are
transmitting frames with a configurable inter-arrival time with
an exponential distribution. The beacon period has been set
to 50ms. For the payload transmission the frame control is
used, e.g. no OFDM data symbols are transmitted. The nodes
are equally configured to generate frames with a given frame
rate.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results. On the x-axis the
number of total generated frames of all 100 nodes in the
network is given. The green curve corresponds to successfully
transmitted frames. The dashed red line corresponds to collided
frames. The number of collided frames/s can exceed the
number of generated frames/s because collided frames will
be transmitted (and may collide) again. Vertical lines have
been added to mark the traffic-values where 3% and 5% of the
transmission attempts collided. At a frame generation rate of
approximately 1075 frames/s the collision probability exceeds
a threshold. From this point on the channel usage rapidly
increases due to retransmitted frames. This in return increases
the collision probability again.
The system should be operated below a frame generation
rate of 1000 frames/s, because otherwise the collision rate is
way to high. The retry counter has been set to 7, e.g. after 7
unsuccessful transmission attempts a frame will be dropped.
VI. CONCLUSION
An overview on the current in-car communication sys-
tems has been given. The requirements for a PLC protocol
for the in-car communication have been summarized. These
requirements commonly differ from the the ones for example
in home area networks. A PLC standard designed for Smart
Grid applications - the HomePlug Green PHY standard - has
been analyzed regarding its applicability as a replacement
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for the LIN-bus. Even though the HomePlug Green PHY
standard has been designed for Smart Grid applications, the
minimum MAC payload is 122 byte when using the smallest
PHY block size (PB136). Currently the payload length of
a LIN or a CAN frame is limited to 8 byte which is far
below the minimum payload of a Green PHY frame. In order
to reduce the overhead, the transmission of the payload in
the variant field of the frame control has been suggested.
Thereby the transmission time of one frame can be reduced
from 353.08µs to 110.48µs. Simulations have shown, that
the additional protocol overhead (backoff, interframe spaces
and acknowledgements) still produce a huge overhead. The
collision probability increases with increasing traffic load.
Thus using a pure CSMA/CA medium access might not meet
the requirements for some applications. If this is the case, the
combination of CSMA/CA and TDMA might be a solution,
as defined in the HomePlug AV standard.
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Abstract—Security and privacy in vehicular communication
are expected to be ensured by the pervasive use of pseudonymous
certificates and signed messages. The design and establishment
of necessary public key infrastructure and hierarchies of cer-
tificate authorities is ongoing in industry consortia, such as
the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium. The privacy pre-
serving dissemination of pseudonymous certificates is however
still expected to be limited to single-hop exchanges between
vehicles. This limitation to one-hop strategies might not be ideal,
especially considering the importance of ensuring trustworthy
stateless information exchange upon reception of the very first
communication packets. We propose to investigate multi-hop pre-
distribution strategies for certificates to significantly reduce this
first encounter problem.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
A core requirement for effective vehicular communication
is secure information exchange between vehicles. As the
volatility of vehicular networks makes stable secure channels
impractical, the commonly accepted solution for inter vehicle
communication (V2V) is to use authenticated messages, based
on a common vehicular public key infrastructure (PKI) and ac-
credited certificate authorities (CA). Relevant standardization
efforts at ETSI [1] and IEEE [2] have proposed appropriate
protocols to implement such architectures. In order to addi-
tionally assure privacy for the passengers of vehicles in such
architectures it is foreseen to issue multiple pseudonymous
identities to vehicles, which can be switched according to given
rulesets. The goal of providing multiple pseudonymous iden-
tities to vehicles is to provide location privacy to passengers.
The dissemination of certificates to vehicles is indirectly
specified in ETSI and IEEE by means of direct inclusion
of certificates in signed messages or through the possibility
to explicit requests the inclusion of certificates. There are
no universal rules that define the inclusion or omission of
certificates, but the fact that certificates represent a significant
amount of data makes it attractive to minimize the amount
of certificate inclusions while maximizing the service quality.
Service quality in this context is the ability to verify incoming
messages of previously unknown vehicles as fast as possible.
Waiting periods for exchanges of certificates after the first
encounter of a vehicle in communication range need to be
minimized. Existing research and suggestions in relevant stan-
dardization effort limit themselves to one-hope dissemination.
PKI systems, such as S/MIME [3], rely on similarly boot-
strapping secure communication through an initial exchange
of certificates between communication partners over not-yet-
secured channels or messages. In case a communication partner
is not available for the initial exchange of certificates it is
possible to use a third party cache of certificates. This is
possible because the trust in certificates does not depend on
secure delivery but instead is solely hinged on (a chain or set
of) trust anchors that certify the authenticity of the enclosed
public keys. The concept of public cache server is popular
for the related PGP/MIME [4] system, where keyservers are
commonly relied on to deliver public key material along
with cross certifications added by third party entities for the
formation of a web-of-trust.
Communication system operating on public internet infras-
tructure can be expected have relatively stable connections and
to tolerate varying amounts of latency to complete such an
initial exchange of certificates to bootstrap secure communi-
cation. No matter if it is done end-to-end between endpoints or
using caches located in keyservers. Vehicular communication
on the other hand operates under more constrained conditions
and under stricter requirements. Hidden station effect can
prevent two way communication, the reachability of caches
in RSUs or backend infrastructure (V2I) can not be assumed
at all times, and the availability of certificate material must
be guaranteed within reasonable latencies with respect to the
beacon frequency and the relative trajectories of the moving
vehicles.
Within the specific constraints of vehicular communication
patterns, it is still possible to envision protocols that use caches
for more effective dissemination of certificates. Also, another
way to investigate dissemination of certificates beyond 1-hop
neighborhood is to adapt protocols that propose to disseminate
neighbor information through 2-hop piggybacking [5]. Such
protocols have been specifically proposed for purposes of dis-
tributed congestion control (DCC) in vehicular communication
networks. Both approaches will be investigated using analytical
models to predict the suitability of these approaches to enhance
the efficiency and effectiveness of certificate distribution in
VANETs.
II. REQUIREMENTS
Pseudonymous certificates are the foundation for both
security and privacy in vehicular communication networks.
Vehicles are expected to locally cache at least a small set
of certificates to have the capability to immediately verify
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the messages of all nearby vehicles even if the (chain of)
relevant certificates are not included in every message. This
can occur when a signed message only includes the digest of
a certificate instead of the full (chain of) certificates in order
to save bandwidth.
For the purpose of our analysis we assume that the size of
a single certificate including compressed NIST P-256 ECDSA
keys is 140 bytes [6]. One GiB of storage space could
store approximately 7.669.584 certificates. Considering that in
Europe alone an estimated number of more than 250 million
vehicles are in use it becomes immediately obvious that pre-
distributing all certificates is not a realistic option. A global
estimate of motor vehicle registrations indicated about 1 billion
vehicles in 2010. Assuming each vehicle would be equipped
with a set of 100.000 pseudonyms to cover every possible 5
minute period over the course of a full year yields and upper
estimate of 100 trillion pseudonymous identities. Storing this
amount of pseudonyms would require about 12 EiB of storage.
We assume as a requirement for our analysis that a vehicles
on-board unit (OBU) are limited to a maximum of 1GiB of
storage space for caches of certificate material.
Another requirement exists relative to a baseline of band-
width consumption for the simple inclusion of certificates in
every message sent by vehicles. For the purpose of our study
we only investigate periodic beacon messages. Combined with
a synthetic channel model and estimates of average vehicles
densities this allows us to calculate probabilities for channel
load and packet loss under various protocols. To derive mean-
ingful metrics of application level service quality, we calculate
the expected awareness quality (AQ) [7] for the awareness of
nearby vehicles in a safety relevant area of 300 m around
vehicles. A penalty for increased latency between the first
encounter of a new vehicle and the first successfully verifiable
secured message is implicitly included in the AQ metric. Any
pre-distribution scheme should improve the AQ compared to
the baseline case of including full certificates in all periodic
messages. Ideally, a new pre-distribution scheme would also
provide improved AQ over certificate omission schemes such
as Neighbor-based Certificate Omission [8] and Congestion-
based Certificate Omission [6].
A third requirement for a new pre-distribution scheme is to
not influence the privacy of passengers by not compromising
the unlinkability of pseudonyms used by a vehicle. This is
a relevant aspect due to the basic fact that pre-distribution
will leak the expected future location of vehicles and their
pseudonym. Even under hierarchic, geographic, or temporal
scoping rules, it should be hard for an attacker to link
pseudonyms as belonging to a single vehicle. We assume an
attacker model that matches common expectations of not being
too powerful in terms of network coverage and not being
mobile enough to outright follow a tracked vehicle.
III. SOLUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The solution space for certificate pre-distribution can be
partitioned into three broad techniques, all of which will be
augmented with directional scoping:
• n-hop dissemination.
• store-and-forward dissemination.
• probabilistic dissemination.
These techniques emphasize different forwarding methods,
but are essentially all based on pushing information where it
is expected to be needed. The opposite approach of pulling
information that might be needed along a given trajectory
would require the ability to accurately predict the positions
of vehicles that are far outside communication range and to
broadcast pull requests beyond the intended trajectory. Both
aspects are deemed prohibitive for efficient use of the available
communication channels.
To ensure the unlinkability of pseudonyms it seems intu-
itively plausible to not pre-distribute multiple pseudonymous
certificates that belong to the same vehicle, as this creates a
link between the two identities. On the other hand, the model of
an attacker against location privacy assumes that a local mobile
follower can watch pseudonym changes anyway. It is even
possible to argue that the pre-distribution of valid pseudonym
certificates without claiming the actual presence of users of
these certificates enlarges the size of the k-anonymity group
without having a negative effect on the service quality through
an introduction of phantom vehicles.
An attractive opportunity to implement pre-distribution
of certificates in VANETs presents itself in the context of
proposed DCC systems [5]. Such systems optimize channel
utilization by aiming to maintain a constant channel busy ratio
(CBR). A CBR value below the ideal target value can be
interpreted as an indication of unused bandwidth. An optional
service quality enhancement scheme such as pre-distribution
of certificates could be a useful consumer of such unused
bandwidth.
As future work we will develop an analytical model that
allows us to model the AQ of different push dissemination
strategies for certificate pre-distribution, and compare the
effectiveness and efficiency against existing inclusion and
omission schemes. Additionally, we will investigate the impact
of certificate pre-distribution on location privacy and possible
interactions with DCC systems.
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Abstract—This position paper proposes new challenges in
data-centric misbehavior detection for vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs). In VANETs, which aim to improve safety and
efficiency of road transportation by enabling communication
between vehicles, an important challenge is how vehicles can
be certain that messages they receive are correct. Incorrectness
of messages may be caused by malicious participants, damaged
sensors, delayed messages or they may be triggered by software
bugs. An essential point is that due to the wide deployment
in these networks, we cannot assume that all vehicles will
behave correctly. This effect is stronger due to the privacy
requirements, as those requirements include multiple certificates
per vehicle to hide its identity. To detect these incorrect messages,
the research community has developed misbehavior data-centric
detection mechanisms, which attempt to recognize the messages
by semantically analyzing the content. The detection of anomalous
messages can be used to detect and eventually revoke the
certificate of the sender, if the message was malicious. However,
this approach is made difficult by rare events –such as accidents–,
which are essentially anomalous messages that may trigger the
detection mechanisms. The idea we wish to explore in this paper
is how attack detection may be improved by also considering the
detection of specific types of anomalous events, such as accidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate goal of the development of vehicular ad-hoc
networks (VANETs) is to improve both safety and efficiency
of road transportation. Although applications in the near future
are designed with drivers in mind, it is conceivable that
VANETs will be combined with recent developments on auto-
mated driving in the future. For this reason, it is especially im-
portant that we develop a secure communication platform from
the ground up. Another important aspect is user-acceptance,
which will deteriorate if the system reports incorrect warnings.
Developments of these security mechanisms have required
several innovations from the security community, especially
in order to deal with the new challenges that VANETs pose.
Notably, these challenges include the strict privacy require-
ments, bandwidth constraints, the ephemeral nature of the
network, lack of permanent access to infrastructure and the
public nature of the messages that are exchanged. We refer the
interested reader to [1] for a more detailed discussion of these
challenges. In summary, it has become clear that pro-active
security mechanisms like digital signatures are not sufficient
to provide security in VANETs; the research community has
proposed complementary reactive security mechanisms, which
detect malicious messages even when they are authentic. This
process is also known as misbehavior detection.
Over the past decade, many security mechanisms for de-
tecting misbehavior have been developed. These can be clas-
sified as either data- or node-centric, representing a focus the
correctness of the content or the trust in a network participant
respectively. A deeper classification and its applications to
other types of networks can be found in [2].
During our study of the literature, we have observed that
the evaluation of these mechanisms is typically performed
against normal/baseline behavior and that same scenario con-
taining one or more attacker. In this paper, we will focus on
data-centric mechanisms that look at the data alone; good
examples of these mechanisms include those proposed by
Leinmu¨ller et al. [3]; among other mechanisms, they describe
the detection of unrealistic speeds, e.g. a claimed speed of
500km/h. One might imagine a similar detection mechanism
could be used for sudden speed drops, but this could lead
to problems: a crashing vehicle may also portray an unusual
pattern (e.g., a very sharp drop in speed). Clearly we cannot
classify a crashing vehicle as a malicious one. This illustrates
that for data-centric misbehavior detection mechanisms, an
important open issue is that we cannot automatically classify
anomalous data as being malicious.
Partially in response to this issue, several authors have
proposed a new class of data-centric detection mechanisms,
which use the driver’s response as a model for correctness [4],
[5]. The idea is that a driver will correctly react to scenarios
such as an accident, even when all detection mechanisms
fail. These mechanisms can be used to eventually expel the
malicious senders from the network. This can significantly
reduce the impact of attackers and damaged sensors, but it
does not prevent the spread of malicious or incorrect messages
throughout the network until the driver should already have
responded to the event. This is undesirable from a user-
perspective: if the driver receives potentially false warnings all
the time, the user acceptance of the applications will go down,
or the users may simply turn the system off. Therefore, we
identify a need to combine both approaches; we need detection
mechanisms that use the driver’s behavior as a baseline, as
well as detection mechanisms that prevent malicious messages
before they arrive.
In the remainder of this paper, we discuss two open issues
regarding data-centric misbehavior detection: the similarity
with the detection of events, such as a crashing vehicle, and the
evaluation of misbehavior detection. Before discussing these
open issues, we discuss how multiple misbehavior detection
mechanisms can be combined into a framework, and we
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elaborate on the state of our current research. Our research
set out to improve detection accuracy, and as we discuss the
open issues we will elaborate how our framework may help
solve them.
II. FRAMEWORKS FOR MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION
In the literature, several authors have already observed this
challenge and proposed the combination of several different
mechanisms [3], as well as frameworks that allow more com-
plex operations [6], [7]. Specifically, Golle et al. [7] discussed
techniques to decide which conclusion is most likely based on
a set of received messages. On the other hand, Raya et al. [6]
and other authors have discussed the more abstract idea of
trust between participants in the network. The idea of their
work is to use node- and data-centric information to provide
a trust value for each participant. This trust value is then used
to predict the likelihood that a message is incorrect.
In our ongoing research, we are developing a framework
to unify the detection of misbehavior in VANETs. Using
subjective logic [8], we build a modular system that can
incorporate arbitrary amounts of detection mechanisms and
usefully combine their results. The goal is to provide filtering
of malicious messages, the exchange of evidence between
nodes and the tools for local or global revocation. Although
the specific advantages of our framework are beyond the scope
of this paper, a core focus for us is the idea that different
mechanisms may perform poorly or very well depending on
the specific scenario. In order to cope with this, we keep the
results from multiple mechanisms, and allow the expression
of uncertainty about a result (for which subjective logic is
our chosen mathematical representation). However, we realized
that because a mechanisms’ (un)certainty about a result may
depend on the context in which it is running; is it designed for
highway or urban scenarios? Is there a connection available to
a back-end system or certificate authority?
III. COMBINING SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY
We have previously noted that there is a significant parallel
between data-centric misbehavior detection and the recognition
of legitimate events that vehicles should notify their drivers
about. In particular, we note that pure data-centric misbehavior
detection is very hard especially for this reason: a sufficiently
powerful attacker will always attempt to imitate a legitimate
event as precise as possible. On the other hand, the detection
of legitimate events is challenging because sensor data may not
be reliable, or have a significant margin of error. We propose
that these mechanisms can complement each other.
Specifically, this position paper proposes the idea that
our framework can facilitate the mechanisms by providing
the appropriate context based on the history. This history,
or the trustworthy subset there-of, can be provided to a
mechanism that is designed to recognize a particular scenario
– for example, a crashing vehicle. Moreover, this process
could be triggered by detection mechanisms, which typically
detect such anomalous events. An approach for this process is
illustrated in Figure 1. This figure shows an arriving message
(1), which triggers a misbehavior detection mechanism to
detect an anomaly (2). This allows the situation recognition
to create a context (3). This context can be used to update
framework
Detector
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Recognize situation
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Context
3: specifies
4:update o
5a: store o
5b: react
Fig. 1. This figure shows how our framework might detect and adapt to a
legitimate anomalous event.
the detection mechanism (4), or it can be used to modify the
opinion directly. The opinion can then be stored (5a), and
if necessary, a reaction can be processed (5b). In practice,
this means that a single misbehavior detection mechanism
may detect a sudden drop in speed, which it recognizes as a
potential attack. Instead of discarding the message, or marking
it as untrustworthy, the message and associated history is first
passed through a mechanism that searches for a specific pattern
–in this example, it could be a crash on a highway (the highway
is the context in this case). Because this mechanism identifies
the message as part of a crash, the framework updates the trust
values towards higher uncertainty.
We propose that our framework extensions may be applied
to decouple the development of event detection mechanisms
for the different settings (e.g., highway or urban), as well
as the specific events that are to be detected (e.g., traffic
jams or crashing vehicles). By describing the individual events
for specific settings, a much clearer and more accurate event
detection mechanism can be developed, which allows for more
certainty regarding the correctness of the misbehavior detection
mechanisms. In addition, it allows us to avoid significant
pitfalls during detection (of both attackers and events) caused
by the attacker producing messages that relate to settings that
are distinct from the actual situation. We can decouple the cor-
rect recognition of a scenario from validating the misbehavior
detection mechanism, which reduces the required simulation
time and the effort required to design the simulations. Ideally,
this decoupling could even allow a formal proof for individual
components, which makes the analysis stronger.
IV. EXAMPLES
We now present two brief examples to motivate the decou-
pling of event and attack detection. Consider an urban setting,
with three vehicles driving on a road at about 50km/h. Just
before a small side-street, the second vehicle breaks hard to
be able to turn into the street. This sudden drop in speed
will be accompanied by a break warning DEMN, and may be
considered anomalous (i.e., suspicious) by several misbehavior
detection mechanisms, due to the absence of an accident.
Nevertheless, it is intuitively clear that this is not misbehavior,
but rather poor driving, because the driver braked too late.
Similarly, consider a highway in a dense forest, where
three vehicles driving behind each other, with an average
speed of around 120km/h. In this situation, the first vehicle
performs a hard break because it detected a stray animal on
the road. Again, the sudden break warning may trigger a
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misbehavior detection mechanism in the following vehicles to
detect misbehavior, until they detect the animal.
In both cases, the context (the side street and the dense
forest, respectively) provides an additional explanation for
the detected event that might otherwise have identified the
sending vehicle as malicious. Similarly, attack detection may
be improved by this decoupling, as it allows the detection of
attacks that imitate the incorrect context. For example, when an
attacker attempts to create a high-speed crash scenario based
on a highway setting in an urban one, we can detect that the
sequence of messages does not match the twists and turns of
the road. In addition, the approach simplifies the development
of misbehavior detection mechanisms, because they no longer
need to provide a generic mechanism capturing all possible
scenarios, but rather can be designed to deal with specific
scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we have proposed several ideas
on how to improve data-centric misbehavior detection in
VANETs. We have briefly discussed existing work, including
approaches that attempt to provide a framework for general
misbehavior detection, and we have pointed out several open
issues. We have then proposed several ideas that can be used to
improve data-centric misbehavior detection and its evaluation,
which we hope provide the material for an exciting discussion
of the topic during the Fachgespra¨ch.
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Abstract—Due to the increasing demand of mobile Machine-
Type Communications (MTC), the interaction between MTC and
human services is a recent problem for cellular communication
systems like Long Term Evolution (LTE). In order to reduce the
negative impact of MTC on human communication, a Learning-
based Channel-Aware Transmission (L-CAT) scheme will be
introduced in this paper. The algorithm bases on a learning
process of cellular connectivity hot spots and is designed for non-
time-critical vehicular data applications like extended Floating
Car Data (xFCD) transmissions for traffic forecast systems. The
results based on real-world measurements show that L-CAT leads
to a much faster data transmission that correlates with a more
resource efficient MTC.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Many mobile devices follow the routes of driving vehicles.
This routes are not randomly, but follow special patterns. For
example the same routes are taken by a vehicle many times: the
way to work or to good friends. This fact can be used in order
to predict mobility of a cellular communication device that is
mounted on a car. The mobility prediction is a feasible input
for traffic management systems. It can be predicted how many
vehicles will pass a certain highway and if this would cause a
traffic jam, some of them could be rerouted. But the mobility
estimation can also be useful for communication issues. In [1]
a method to improve handover quality of cellular communi-
cation systems by means of a mobility forecast algorithm is
shown. However, the same routes correspond also to a similar
communication connectivity. This fact will be used in this
paper to improve non-real-time vehicular data applications.
We present Learning-based Channel-Aware Transmission (L-
CAT), a decentralized communication approach that uses a
learning process of cellular connectivity in vehicular environ-
ments. L-CAT detects good communication locations, stores
them, provides them to others users and uses them for the
next drive at the same route to improve the communication
efficiency.
The transmission scheme can be used to provide vehicular
sensor data (so called extended Floating Car Data (xFCD) [2])
very efficiently to a traffic management server. This Machine-
Type Communication (MTC), which can be carried e.g. by
a Long Term Evolution (LTE) network, should interfere as
less as possible with other human users in the communication
network. LTE MTC is a recent topic in the evolution of
the standardization of LTE technology follower [3] [4]. An
overview about vehicular LTE data communication can be
found in [5].
The usage of the channel quality for efficient cellular
communication is a common approach on different layers of
the communication system. Channel-dependent scheduling [6]
(also for the uplink [7]) is one famous example for using
the channel quality, aggregated at the base station of many
active LTE users, to schedule the users to the best resources in
time and frequency domain. In contrast to channel-dependent
scheduling, L-CAT works on the application layer and decen-
tralized without the need of an active communication link.
In [8] a channel-aware transmission scheme is presented for
random access networks. This scheme works without learning
process and uses a threshold function for the transmission de-
cision. A forecast algorithm for mobile connectivity in the area
of wireless and cellular communication systems is presented in
[9]. The scheme takes active performance indicators (e.g. data
rate) into account for the prediction of good communication
locations for WiFi and cellular communication networks.
The key contributions of this paper are:
• The L-CAT scheme that uses a learning process of the
cellular connectivity (cf. Sec. II).
• L-CAT implementation for the performance evaluation by
real world measurements (cf. Sec. III).
• L-CAT leads to a much faster data transmission due to
a local transmission decision that is based on the LTE
connectivity (cf. Sec. IV).
• The faster data transmission is correlated with a more
resource efficient communication, so that L-CAT needs
less physical resources for the same MTC payload size.
II. L-CAT CONCEPT
In [10], a channel-aware transmission scheme is proposed
for xFCD transmissions. The transmission policy is extended
by a learning component of the cellular connectivity in this
paper. Fig. 1 illustrates the L-CAT concept. The transmission
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decision is done locally in the LTE device mounted on a ve-
hicle. It depends on the data priority and cellular connectivity.
The LTE connectivity estimation is based on two components,
historical data and live measurements of passive indicators like
Reference Signal Receive Power (RSRP) and Reference Signal
Received Quality (RSRQ). The historical data contains passive
as well as active connectivity indicators (e.g. local dependent
data rate) and the historical mobility. The live measurements
are only focused on passive performance indicators so that
no active connection to the cellular communication system is
needed before the transmission decision is done locally in the
LTE device.
The cellular communication carries the xFCD in the uplink
as well as the traffic state and forecast from the traffic server
in the downlink. Connectivity maps that are generated by the
devices are also stored in the server. We suggest a bidirectional
update of the map in the vehicular and server via WiFi (e.g.
ones in a week).
Traffic server
L-CAT: Local transmission
decision dependent on
- Data priority
- Connectivity quality
LTE UE in vehicle
LTE eNodeB
Live, passive measurements
- LTE RSRP and RSRQ
- GPS position
Historical data
- Passive LTE connectivity
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- Active LTE connectivity
(data rate map)
- Mobility
LTE connectivity estimation
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the L-CAT Concept.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF L-CAT FOR LTE FIELD TESTS
This section summarizes the so far implemented function-
alities of L-CAT. According to Fig. 1, we implemented a
first version in an Android app. The app contains four basic
components that are needed for L-CAT in the device:
• A look up map, where the historical connectivity map
is stored. In the app, local dependent connectivity is
simplified by good connectivity hot spots. These are
Global Positioning System (GPS) locations with a radius
that describes regions with a very good connectivity (we
use RSRP > -90 dBm).
• A measurement function that monitors passively the
current LTE parameters.
• The LTE connectivity estimation is simplified in a func-
tion that calculates the time until the next connectivity hot
spot is reached by the current GPS position and velocity.
• The transmission decision in our app depends on good
connectivity hot spots. We transmit a User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet of 100 kByte if we are in such a
hot spot or if we predict that the next hot spot is more
than five minutes away.
The measurements are performed in the public LTE network
of Deutsche Telekom. As performance indicator we measure
the transmission time. We will show in the result section that
this indicator is strongly correlated with the number of LTE
Resource Blocks (RBs).
IV. RESULTS
For the performance analysis of L-CAT, we performed field
tests in Dortmund, Germany. A map with measured LTE RSRP
values of one example test drive is illustrated in Fig. 2. The
RSRP over time is shown in Fig. 3. On the one hand, the
driving route includes regions where no LTE coverage is given:
e.g. at location B, a tunnel shadows the LTE signal. On the
other hand, there are locations where the LTE signal quality
is very good. Nearby to position D, an LTE base station is
located. This results in RSRP values to up to -75 dBm.
The average RSRP is -99 dBm. This is also the average
value if no CAT is applied, which means that the data is trans-
mitted periodically. By applying L-CAT, the average RSRP
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for triggering an LTE communication, increases to -85 dBm.
This is due to the fact that locations D and E are identified
as hot spots. For CAT, an average RSRP of -89 dBm can be
achieved. The communication under better channel conditions
leads to a much faster data transmission. Fig. 4 illustrates
the transmission time of 100 kByte uplink data as box plots.
These results are gained from a measurement campaign of
2 h duration. It can be seen from the figure that a very wide
range of transmission times is given for a transmission without
CAT. The very high values result from LTE communications
at location A or between D and E, where the connectivity is
very bad. For CAT, the average transmission time decreases to
540 ms in contrast to 720 ms for a periodical transmission. The
fact that many transmissions are also very fast (< 1 s) without
CAT is caused by the good LTE coverage in the surroundings
of location D. By applying L-CAT, the average transmission
time can be deceased to 430 ms. Furthermore, peaks with a
very high transmission time can be avoided by the usage of
these hot spots. In our measurement campaign, the maximum
transmission time with L-CAT is 730 ms. These results show
that the LTE connectivity based on a passive indicator (we
use the RSRP) recorded in previous measurements can be
used in order to optimize an active LTE communication in
the presence.
We have shown in [11] that the same LTE deployment
provides a scheduler that is similar to a max rate scheduling for
small packets. This means that users with a very low RSRP
value are assigned less RBs in the frequency domain than
users with good channel conditions. This leads to the fact
that for a low RSRP, the duration of the transmission is not
only longer because more total resource are necessary (due
to a more robust modulation and coding and retransmissions),
but also because the resources in the frequency domain are
restricted. However, there is still a strong correlation between
transmission time and total number of RBs given. This rela-
tionship is shown in Fig. 4. These LTE field measurements are
gained with the same setup used in [11]. By means of a real-
time spectrum analyzer, the RBs in time and frequency domain
are captured at seven different locations with various channel
conditions. The correlation coefficient between transmission
time and total number of RBs is 0.82.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented L-CAT, a decentralized
transmission protocol for vehicular data applications. The
transmission decision is based on a learning process of the
cellular communication connectivity. The performance of L-
CAT is analyzed by real-world measurements. It is shown that
the communication policy leads to a much faster vehicular
data transmission that is correlated with a much higher LTE
resource efficiency. In the future, we will validate the L-CAT
scheme by protocol simulations and extent the transmission
decision by taken application characteristics into account. In
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addition, we will develop more complex forecasting algorithms
in order to predict the mobility in challenging scenarios.
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Abstract—Vehicular communication technology is nearing de-
ployment in the market. We see initial plug tests in 2013 to con-
firm interoperability of multiple independent implementations.
As the entrance into the market is coming closer it is time to
consider the privacy expectations of the relevant standards. These
expectations are built upon location privacy through unlinkable
pseudonyms. In this paper we focus on the real world privacy
expectations that can be fulfilled in the first generation of
vehicular communication technology using pseudonymity. What
level of privacy is really achievable and does the effort to achieve
this level privacy justify the cost and complexity of introducing
pseudonymity into vehicular communication?
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Privacy for passengers of cooperative vehicles was iden-
tified as a requirement for market acceptance quite early
in the process of developing vehicular communication in-
frastructure. The SEcure VEhicular COMmunication project
(SeVeCom) [1] collected relevant attacker scenarios and pro-
posed pseudonyms as a useful approach to provide privacy
in vehicular contexts. The use of pseudonyms does not imply
anonymity, because short-term identities are still attached to
vehicles to ensure accountability and non-repudiation. The
key requirement for the effectiveness of pseudonyms is their
unlinkability for attackers, while authorities may have the
ability to resolve pseudonymous identities to the owner of a
vehicle.
Major standardization efforts for vehicular communication
systems at ETSI [2] and IEEE [3] consider pseudonymity in
their security architectures. However, important details remain
underspecified and subject to research. The biggest open
question concerns the strategy for pseudonym changes, which
has a large influence on the effectiveness of pseudonyms.
Previous research efforts have already highlighted challenges
of performing effective pseudonym changes. According to
these efforts it requires drastic measures, such as silent pe-
riods [4], [5] or context sensitive collaborative operations in
mix-zones [6], [7] to ensure meaningful k-anonymity. Only
recently have researchers started to investigate the impact of
pseudonym change strategies on service quality [8]. Never-
theless the full consequences and practicability of pseudonym
change strategies in realistic environments are still not well
understood.
The implications of these issues raise concerns about
the practicability of meaningful privacy guarantees through
pseudonym changes. Is effective location privacy attainable
without severe penalties for service quality? Is it attainable if a
significant amount of collaborative vehicles is simply unwilling
or unable to participate in adequate pseudonym change proto-
cols? What kind of attacker can pseudonym change protocols
even protect against?
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND ATTACKER MODELS
A. Service quality assumptions
The potential for Sybil attacks has been identified in
previous works related to security and privacy in vehicular net-
works [9], [10], which is a reason to strictly limit the validity of
pseudonymous certificates. Recommendations for deployments
of pseudonymous certificates suggest lifetimes of around five
minutes [11]. However such configurations would prevent
pseudonym change strategies that rely on unpredictable context
sensitive and/or collaborative pseudonym change strategies.
Any unpredictable pseudonym change strategy requires the
availability of multiple valid pseudonyms. Proof-of-work sys-
tems might counter simple sybil attack scenarios, though
fundamentally the risk of sybil attacks remains.
Recent research by Lefevre and Petit [8] has highlighted the
severe impact of silent periods [4], [5] as part of a pseudonym
change strategy on service quality of Intersection Collision
Avoidance (ICA) applications. This observation is unlikely
to be limited to ICA applications. Cooperative awareness is
the fundamental building block of many safety applications
in vehicular networks, such as ICA. An unfortunately timed
pseudonym change could break the stability of cooperative
awareness. The basic position beacons that all vehicles are
expected to broadcast to announce their position and trajectory
are sometimes even called Cooperative Awareness Messages
(CAM) [12]. These are mandatory messages and the awareness
of the exact position of surrounding vehicles is a key enabler
for most safety applications. The need for awareness of sur-
rounding entities is a fundamental requirement. Privacy preser-
vation efforts must not interfere with this requirement. If a fully
anonymous communication protocol was available, it would
not be an applicable solution for vehicular communication
networks. This is because it would make entities untrackable
even in close proximity, thus breaking the correctness of the
awareness of surrounding vehicles. Local trackability is the
foundation of cooperative safety.
As pointed out by Lefevre and Petit [8], if pseudonym
changes include long silent periods, it would become untenable
to build services that provide safety critical services. It appears
reasonable to only allow silent periods in situations without
any safety relevant interactions with other vehicles. However,
it is not predictable if and how frequently such situations
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will occur. Furthermore due to hidden station effects even the
detection of such situations is unlikely to be reliable enough for
consideration in combination with safety critical applications.
Mix Zones [6] have been proposed as a way to collabo-
ratively perform pseudonym changes. This technique can give
a reasonable amount of expected k-anonymity even under the
assumption that an attacker can observe the entire pseudonym
change process. The Mix Zones concept achieves a consid-
erable effectiveness in this scenario, however the attacker is
considered to be a passive observer. The synchronization of
pseudonym changes with other entities implies that privacy
decisions depend on external input. Unavailability, inability or
even malicious unwillingness to participate in a pseudonym
change process might prevent vehicles from ever changing
their pseudonyms. Additionally the adherence to as combined
silent period would be problematic for the above mentioned
reasons. This also applies to encrypting messages instead
of stopping to send messages, as proposed by Freudiger
(CMIX) [7]. The potential inability of nearby vehicles to
process messages would have a similarly negative effect on
service quality, while high resolution tracking would still allow
for tracking of even encrypted beacons.
B. Attacker models
The natural upper bound for an attacker is an all seeing
observer with the ability to perform active attacks. A combina-
tion of mix zones and silent periods could thwart an all seeing
passive attacker, but as discussed previously, silent periods and
reliance on cooperative pseudonym change protocols may not
be realistic options in practice. A study about the effectiveness
of an all seeing attacker using Multi Hypothesis Tracking
(MHT) was performed by Wiedersheim et.al. [13] and shows
high levels of success for the attacker, even under noisy data
and extremely frequent pseudonym changes. We are not aware
of effective countermeasures against an all seeing passive or
active observer under realistic service quality requirements.
Even with gaps in the coverage of the attacker it is highly
likely that an attacker can simply watch and match vehicles
across pseudonym changes. Advanced tracking algorithms are
very effective at tracking and predicting vehicle mobility.
A set of studies examining plausibility checks of location
claims reveals high success rates of vehicle tracking using
Kalman filters [14], [15] and Particle filters [16]. Such local
tracking of nearby vehicles also reveals an interesting lower
bound on attacker capabilities. There is no effective way of
defending location privacy against a single mobile attacker,
which simply follows a vehicle. Such following can be based
on the position beacons or alternatively on sensor readings
that work in close proximity to the surveilled vehicle. The
mobile attacker can then watch the surveilled vehicle, trivially
observing and linking any pseudonym change in the vehicular
communication channel.
III. FUTURE WORK
We see that the pseudonym changes are ineffective against
powerful all seeing observers and ineffective against small but
mobile observers. The protection level against medium sized
attackers is subject to further research. It is likely dependent
on attacker mobility and the coverage of the relevant area.
Covering for example intersections and considering knowledge
of pseudonym change strategies should enable very effec-
tive tracking. Reliably privacy protection within the existing
pseudonymity framework is only provided against small im-
mobile attackers. We see that that pseudonym changes under
realistic assumptions can only protect effectively against this
kind of weak attacker. It becomes reasonable to wonder if
pseudonym changes at the beginning and at the end of a trip
might suffice.
Ultimately, it might be worth questioning if the cost and the
complexity of implementing pseudonymous communication is
justified by the limited level of attainable privacy. It might
also be worth considering whether the concealment of vehicle
identification is necessary to protect the privacy of passengers.
Car sharing models might make it questionable to directly
link vehicle ownership to the identity of the human driver.
Moreover, what if an autonomous vehicle does not even carry
a passenger? Meanwhile, passengers do expect privacy in the
sense of being anonymous, while pseudonym change strategies
can only offer unlinkability against small and medium sized
immobile attackers.
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Abstract—As the finalisation of several components of the Intel-
ligent Transport System (ITS) network stack for communication
in the 5.9 GHz spectrum (ITS-G5) is taking shape, it is about
time to evaluate the performance of the European Inter-Vehicle
Communication (IVC) communication variant as backed by the
CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) as a whole.
In order to evaluate the performance of ITS-G5 stations, it is
useful to study the interaction of the involved network layers.
In this paper, progress made towards an ITS-G5 implementation
capable to be used in embedded and simulation environments is
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
After several years of design and research in IVC some not
yet finalised standards are now expected to get approved soon.
For example, the GeoNetworking (GN) specification [1] is at
the time of writing in the final approval procedure. Some other
standards as the p amendment to IEEE 802.11, also known
as pWLAN for short, are established for years already. In
the context of this paper an IVC system is a network stack
according to recent ETSI ITS specifications and configured as
described by the C2C-CC Basic System Standards Profile [2].
While a few hundred milliseconds latency might not be
critical for informational services, it can be fatal for safety-
critical services, if data is not disseminated within a short time
frame, depending on the particular use case. For that reason, it
is necessary to assure, that the designed communication system
as well as a particular implementation is capable to satisfy
such time frames even under stressful conditions. As has been
shown in [3], there arise problems like oscillating Distributed
Congestion Control (DCC) states when channel load is just
increased enough. Therefore, it is promising to investigate if
it is still possible to maintain low-latency requirements for
safety-critical messages.
Taking these considerations into account, testing of pWLAN
based Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) should be possi-
ble in a cost-efficient, reliable and replicable manner. Further-
more, a testing setup shall be able to handle scenarios with
a lot of vehicles and therefore a crowded radio channel, so
a network stack’s behaviour can be studied with suboptimal
communication premises.
Though large-scale field tests have been conducted in the
past [4], these tend to be expensive and it is hard to repeat
those. As the system evolves, tests have to be carried out
again though. An appropriate way out of this dilemma are
simulations. In the following, an extended version of the
Veins framework 2.1 [5] is presented. Veins already supports
the coupling of network communication and realistic vehicle
mobility simulation, which are the fundamental aspects of IVC.
The extension covers an complete ITS-G5 stack and enables
the integration of real communication devices. Since there are
already experts working on measurements of the radio signal
itself, e.g. as part of ETSI ITS Plugtests in November 2013,
the following simulation-based test setup focuses on protocol
interactions from access layer upwards, but not on physical
radio propagation phenomena like multipath, reflections et
cetera. Instead, a simplified model supplied with Veins [6] is
used to determine if vehicles are within communication range.
Simulations have already been conducted for various aspects
of VANETs, which are either limited to certain layers or
single use cases though. Since the simulations presented in
[3] are also utilising the Veins framework, they are similar
to those designated in this paper. However, they had a focus
on the physical and access layer. Other aspects like multi-hop
transport types and its implications are not considered.
II. DESIGN
One problem inherent to simulations is to make sure,
that the simulation model and its assumptions match real
world conditions appropriately. This issue is approached in the
following with the conception of an ETSI ITS-G5 compliant
stack named Vanetza, which is intended to be usable for event
discrete simulations like Veins and is nonetheless executable
on embedded systems. It can be handy to run the network
stack on a real device for testing the interoperability with other
implementations and thereby validate the simulation model, at
least partly. Furthermore, an outline is given of a possibility to
test a Device Under Test (DUT) with channel load generated
by a simulated environment, as it is sketched in Figure 1. For
this purpose a DUT can interact with the simulation over its
radio interface. The radio interface is chosen, because it is
common for all ITS-G5 devices and all layers of the DUT are
included in this way.
As a guideline for the features required to implement for
Day One usage as propagated by the C2C-CC, refer to its
Basic System Standards Profile [2] and the accompanying
document concerning DCC [7].
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A. Simulation
Simulations enable investigation of scenarios with po-
tentially lots of participating vehicles. Veins [6] employs
OMNeT++ [8] for the simulation of network communication
and SUMO [9] for vehicle mobility. Since OMNeT++ is based
on the concept of discrete event simulation, time progress is
controlled by an event scheduler maintaining an event list.
Therefore, the network stack’s awareness of time progress is
caused by increasing time stamps provided by the simulation.
In order to handle timeouts internal to the network stack, e.g.
the BEACON timer of GN [1] or expiration of location table
entries, the network stack can propose the next invocation
time stamp. Hence an appropriate event can be scheduled.
Furthermore, the Vanetza network stack has to be capable to
get instantiated multiple times in the same simulation system
process. This is not achievable with the proprietary network
stack implementations known to us.
B. Embedded System
For demonstration of the Vanetza communication stack on
embedded systems, the well-known MK2 of Cohda Wireless1
is deployed. This device allows injection and interception of
custom packets at the Medium Access (MAC) layer through a
raw packet socket Application Programming Interface (API).
Since there are only constrained hardware resources available
on embedded systems like the MK2, it is mandatory to keep
resource usage by the network stack low. In addition, this
requirement holds true for powerful machines where the simu-
lation is executed, because these have to run possibly hundreds
of network stack instances in parallel. Events from outside, i.e.
data indications from the MAC layer or data requests from the
application layer, are handled quite similar to the simulation
mode. Occurrence and order of these events, however, is not
scheduled in advance but caused by environmental stimuli. In
contrast to the simulation mode, there is an additional timer
component in embedded systems mode, which triggers the
internal events of the network stack.
The MAC layer is accessed in both cases through a light-
weight interface which unifies the network stack’s communi-
cation to the simulated MAC interface in Veins and the raw
packet socket on Cohda’s MK2 device.
C. Combination of Simulation and Embedded System
Beside purely simulative or embedded use cases, a hybrid
approach is useful for testing devices. Therefore, bridging the
gap between both worlds by coupling simulation and a DUT
is beneficial.
Figure 1 gives a conceptional overview of a simulation
architecture, which integrates a real ITS-G5 device, so it
can interact with the simulation. In the simulation a single
vehicle is selected, which shall represent the Ego vehicle.
It represents movement and communication behaviour of the
real hardware DUT in the simulated world. This simulated
vehicle is special, because its upper network stack is not
1http://www.cohdawireless.com/product/mk2.html
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Fig. 1. Simulation architecture
part of the simulation, but executed on the DUT . When the
Ego vehicle’s simulated MAC layer receives a packet from its
virtual environment, this packet is relayed to DUT through
a component called pWLAN proxy. This pWLAN proxy is
a MK2 device with a custom application connected to the
simulation over Ethernet. At the same time pWLAN proxy
and DUT are able to communicate over the air. However, not
all packets sent by simulated vehicles are relayed. Only those
packets with a signal strength above a predefined threshold
are forwarded to the proxy. Signal strength degrades with
increasing distance of signal path and number of obstacles
along this path, as presented in [6]. The other way round
packets emitted by the DUT are captured by the proxy and
injected in the simulation and virtually transmitted to Ego
vehicle’s neighbours. There is also a data stream of Global
Positioning System (GPS) positions going from the simulation
to DUT , which allows us to fake GPS positions for the network
stack running on DUT .
Since the simulation has to react on external stimuli,
the event scheduler of the event discrete simulation tool
OMNeT++ used by Veins has to be replaced with a custom
implementation. While the default scheduler tries to make
progress as fast as possible, i.e. the simulated time is not
bound to wall clock time, the customized scheduler named
ProxyScheduler tries to keep simulated and wall clock time
synchronized. In Figure 2 an example of ProxyScheduler’s
behaviour is depicted as sequence chart. Instead of continuing
with the following event immediately as the default scheduler
does, ProxyScheduler listens for messages from outside
until the wall clock time catches up. If a message is received
in the meantime, a new simulation event is generated and
put into OMNeT++’s event data structure cMessageHeap
appropriately. The communication connection to the outside
environment is provided through the CohdaProxy, which
incorporates the data exchange between simulation and proxy.
Of course, this mechanism works only as long as the computer
is able to process simulation events faster then the wall clock
time progresses. If there are too many simulated vehicles, this
is no longer the case. A speedup in simulation execution might
be achievable through parallelization though. At the moment
all events are processed in strict sequential order.
In order to keep hardware costs low, a single MK2 device
has to handle the packets of several simulated vehicles. Thus
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Fig. 2. Scheduling of a simulation event due to an incoming DUT packet
latency experiments were conducted to see if such a device
is capable to do so. The measurement series in Figure 3
shows the round-trip-time for a packet with 500 bytes of MAC
payload sent by one MK2 (ping) and returned by another
(echo). A lot of round-trip-times are located around 4.9, 6.0
and 6.5 ms. Interestingly, there are also repeated peeks up
to 10 ms with uniform intervals. Since there is no increase
in packet loss at the same time, this is possibly caused
by a temporarily increased processor load, e.g. a periodic
kernel task delaying packet processing slightly. Channel load
is controlled through an artificial pause of 2 ms between two
pings, whereas echoes are replied as fast as possible. Reducing
the pause by 1 ms caused an immense increase of measured
round-trip-time. Increasing the pause, however, did not affect
the reliability of the transmission significantly. A 2 ms pause
means 500 messages per second just sent by one MK2 and
the double number of messages occupying the channel in the
same time. Because of size constraints, presentation of further
results for other packet lengths and timings are omitted. If
channel load regulations are considered as enforced by DCC
[7], which restricts the average maximum message rate in
relaxed state to less than 20 messages per second per station,
the load of at least 25 neighbour stations could be represented
with one MK2 device. Consequently, it is possible to reduce
the number of required communication devices significantly.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
For the basic services, namely the Physical (PHY) and MAC
layers of IEEE 802.11p, it is possible to rely on already
available implementations. Since the interfaces provided by
Veins’ implementation of these layers were too limited to a
certain use case, some minor customisations were necessary
to make them more generic.
In the following, some implementation decisions are high-
lighted and explained, how these simplify reasoning about
specifications. For demonstration purposes the GN layer as
specified in [1] is used. The motivation to employ C++
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for the network stack implementation stems from the desire
of reasonable performance and easy interaction with APIs
written in C like the Cohda Software Development Kit (SDK).
Furthermore, simulation tools like OMNeT++ are written in
C++ too.
To simplify reasoning about the specification the source
code should be kept as close to the specification language as
possible. Consequently, maintenance code should be kept at a
bare minimum, i.e. it is unfavourable to clutter code aligned
to the specification text with memory management and low-
level maintenance of data structures. Instead, it is favourable
to have compact and expressive code.
A. Byte order
Though byte order is not a new difficulty, it can still cause
some headaches. If a field in GN headers consists of multiple
bytes, it has to be transmitted in big endian byte order [1,
p. 12]. The host byte order of e.g. x86 processors, however, is
litte endian. There are a number of C functions for swapping
bytes, but there is no way to distinguish which kind of order is
present in a particular variable. Developers have to remember
the used byte order, which causes subtle errors when values
with different byte orders are mixed carelessly. Since it is
syntactically valid code, the compiler will not produce any
warnings though. In Linux kernel development a dedicated
tool is used for detection of semantic errors as e.g. illegal
assignment of little endian values to big endian variables and
vice versa [10]. This, however, requires an additional step
during the build process. Vanetza’s way to deal with byte
order, however, is based on C++’s type system and therefore
enforced by the C++ compiler. Types as e.g. uint16le_t
and uint16be_t are distinct types based on standard C++’s
uint16_t type with the associated byte order encoded as
part of the type information. Sequence numbers within GN
headers for example are of type uint16be_t and thus stored
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in big endian order, whereas for arithmetic manipulation in
program logic they are available in host byte order. At runtime
these custom types just occupy as much memory as their
underlying type. Through byte swapping they can be converted
into each other seamlessly while retaining appropriate byte
order information. The accompanying byte swapping functions
are left out if two variables’ byte order matches already and
result in no performance loss at runtime. In the end, the
described approach helped to get rid of byte order confusions
and hence data fields transmitted in wrong byte order.
B. Encoding of Quantities
Quantities, consisting of a magnitude and a unit, are en-
coded in various ways in GN header fields. For example,
heading values have a precision of 1/10 degree in Long Position
Vectors whereas the angle in a GeoBroadcast (GBC) header
has a precision of 1 degree. Thus, a value of 10 has to be
interpreted as 1 degree and 10 degree respectively, though both
fields are of 16 bit unsigned integer type. It might also be
favourable to use another unit internally, because the C/C++
math library expects angle values in radian measure instead
of angular degree. Fortunately, there is already a library
called Boost.Units available [11], which allows to enrich
scalar types like double with unit information and even
provides dimensional analysis at compile time. Based on this
library, special types for header field quantities can be built,
which relieve developers from the burden to remember the
currently involved scaled unit and convert appropriately. With
the introduction of these types it was possible to track down
several implementation errors. Without these types careful
source code analysis and time-consuming debugging would
have been necessary. Furthermore, there is now a lower risk to
introduce bugs during source code changes, e.g. due to missing
scaling of values.
IV. CONCLUSION
During the implementation of the GN layer, some unsound
parts were discovered and reported to our project partner and
after internal review to ETSI for further discussion. As one
example, an unnecessary delay when a source station is going
to send a GBC message utilising Contention Based Forwarding
(CBF) [1, Annex E.3] has been found. While for forwarder
operation the CBF timers are essential, they are meaningless
for source operation because the message originates from
source station. In the worst case this introduces a delay of
100 ms, the maximum duration of a packet in the CBF buffer.
This reduces the total time available for a receiving vehicle to
react on a possibly safety-critical message.
Another example concerns the buffering of GBC packets.
Since the CBF algorithm might execute the greedy forwarding
algorithm, a GBC packet might be buffered in a unicast buffer
by greedy forwarding. Consequently, the intended behaviour
of the GN layer is unclear at this point. In this case a proposal
has been made to buffer it in the semantically correct broadcast
buffer and re-execute the forwarding algorithm which caused
the buffering in first place when flushing the buffer later on.
As the presented implementation has not yet been finished,
possibly more feedback can be given soon for elimination
of remaining glitches, so a reference system as envisaged
by C2C-CC can be built with less effort. Furthermore, the
authors are looking forward to simulate large scenarios with
C2C-CC Day One compliant communication stacks as soon
as all Day One features are covered. When the network stack
running on an embedded system is adjudged to be conformant
to the specification, it can be concluded due to the common
code base, that its simulation counter-part is most probably
conformant as well. This increases the confidence into future
simulation results.
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Abstract—Driving vehicles in platoons has the potential to
improve traffic efficiency, increase safety, reduce fuel consump-
tion, and make driving experience more enjoyable. A lot of
effort is being spent in the development of technologies, like
radars, enabling automated cruise control following and ensuring
emergency braking if the driver does not react in time; but
these technologies alone do not empower real platooning. As
platoons will initially share the road with human-driven vehicles,
interesting new questions regarding the interactions between the
two categories of vehicles arise. In this paper we briefly describe
the focus of our research, i.e., the analysis of interferences caused
by non-automated vehicles during a maneuver. As an example,
we consider the JOIN maneuver. We define the application layer
protocol to support the maneuver, together with situations that
can prevent successful termination, and describe how they can
be detected. We then show the validity of the idea by simulating
some sample scenarios, showing either that the maneuver can
successfully be performed, or safely be aborted. As final contri-
bution, we describe our idea toward a modular approach, i.e.,
the development of complex maneuvers by combining smaller
sub-maneuvers, aiming to ease development and safety analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Better road usage and increased safety will pass through
the capability of vehicles to implement cooperative driving,
platooning for short. Albeit recently there has been a strong
focus on autonomous or semi-autonomous driving [1], where
Inter-Vehicular Communication (IVC) is not needed, only
platooning, which requires fully developed IVC, can guarantee
improved road safety, while increasing the infrastructure usage
and reducing fuel consumption [2].
Platooning is much more than simple car following. Platoons
must be built and split, vehicles must be able to join and
leave, the platoon leader must be changed, e.g., because
the driver is tired or has reached his destination. All the
possible maneuvers must be supported by a proper application
level protocol, providing the communication primitives or
Application Programming Interface (API) needed to implement
them. Indeed, this is only the starting point, as the API must
provide also the means to cope with impairments, unexpected
situations, partially failing communications, interfering vehicles,
and finally also the emergency maneuver to relinquish the
vehicles’ control to all the drivers safely in case there are no
more the conditions to operate the platoon.
In this paper, we briefly analyze the application layer protocol
for a join maneuver, which is able to handle interferences
by human driven vehicles. We implement the protocol into
our platooning extension for Veins [3], [4], and show how it
performs in two sample scenarios. Finally we describe how
we intend to further tackle this problem in our future research,
i.e., moving toward a modular approach.
II. RELATED WORK
The scientific community investigated different ways to per-
form maneuvers in an Automated Highway System (AHS), both
with and without the infrastructure cooperation. One approach
assuming infrastructure cooperation tackles the problem from
a control theoretic point of view, defining the laws to control
the vehicles during the maneuvers, together with higher layer
mechanisms to the cars involved [5], [6].
Another high level approach is presented in [7]. The authors
describe a set of different communication patterns that can be
used in order to exchange data while performing a maneuver.
Moreover, they define a set of controllers each of those
responsible for a different situation. For instance, there is
a controller dedicated to obstacle avoidance. However, not
much details on how a particular fault should be detected and
communicated to other parties are given.
Other works focus on mechanical and network fault handling,
investigating how to detect and to react to them in order to
minimize risks [8] or performance loss [9].
Recently, mixed highway scenarios have gained more atten-
tion [10]. The aim is to make platoons able to travel on public
roads, avoiding the deployment of dedicated infrastructure.
This poses new challenges that need to be addressed due to
the presence of human drivers which might interfere with
platooning operations. In [11], for example, the authors study
mechanisms to perform cooperative maneuvers (e.g., a lane
change by an entire platoon) to avoid dangerous situation.
In this context, the challenge of defining an application level
protocol that support the different maneuvers, seen as different
applications, has not been tackled to the best of our knowledge.
The identification of external events due to the presence of
other road users, or to other impairments as communication
faults, and the algorithms that the applications deploy to react
to the situation are extremely important to make platooning
safe and acceptable by the broad public.
III. MANEUVERS AND SCENARIOS
To properly support platooning, a set of required maneuvers
needs to be implemented. The first and most studied one is the
FOLLOW maneuver, i.e., standard cruising, where interesting
issues on multi-body control have to be solved and that
represent the steady-state of a platoon. From a communi-
cations perspective FOLLOW can be realized with standard
DSRC/WAVE beacons; a working version implementing the
controller defined in [6] is available in an extension of Veins
simulator we use for evaluation [3], [4].
From a protocol point of view the maneuvers to form and
to manage a platoon are more challenging, e.g., JOIN, LEAVE,
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(a) Normal procedure
(b) Interference by slower vehicle in front
Figure 1. Graphical sketch of different situations for the JOINMIDDLE
maneuver. Automated cars shown in dark color.
MERGE, and SPLIT require a more sophisticated coordination
among cars than simply receiving beacons from the other cars
in the platoon. Moreover, they have additional parameters, e.g.,
the position in the platoon where a car wants to JOIN.
Here, we are instead interested in shedding some insight on
platoons management and the communication challenges they
pose, specially in face of “external threats”, such as human
driven vehicles interfering with the maneuvers.
As a representative of management maneuvers in this
paper we focus on the JOIN procedure, assuming that one
car joins the platoon in the middle, which is clearly more
challenging than joining at the head or at the tail of the platoon.
Besides considering the plain procedure, we also include in
the protocol “escape” procedures, to handle cases when there
are interferences by human-driven vehicles. For the sake of
simplicity the escape is just aborting the maneuver and returning
to normal platooning.
An example of a JOIN maneuver is shown in Figure 1. In
the standard setup (Figure 1a), a vehicle creates a gap to let
another one in. A slower human-driven vehicles may however
be encountered while approaching the platoon which prevents
the joiner to conclude the maneuver (Figure 1b). This situation
must be detected and reported to the high layer logic which
should decide what is the best action to undertake.
In this paper we consider two specific scenarios. In an
extended version of this work we considered more situations,
but for the sake of brevity we have chosen a subset and tried
to focus on the idea:
• Scenario 1 (far truck interference): the joining vehicle
encounters a truck on the lane where it is trying to join, but
the truck does not prevent the conclusion of the maneuver
as it is far enough.
• Scenario 2 (close truck interference): as for Scenario 1, a
slow truck obstructs the joining vehicle, but this time it
is forced to abort to avoid a collision.
We assume that vehicles are controlled and travel as
envisioned in the SARTRE project [10]: drivers instruct the
vehicle, which are otherwise entirely autonomous, through
a Human Machine Interface (HMI). Actions like steering or
touching the brakes disengage the Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC) and lead to the platoon split. How this happens,
however, is out of the scope of this paper.
All platooning-capable vehicles are equipped with an IEEE
802.11p compliant device, a GPS receiver, and a radar. The
CACC, in order to safely perform automated close-following,
needs acceleration and speed values of a subset of vehicles
in the platoon. Such subset depends on the design of the
controller itself. We adopt the controller designed during the
PATH project [6], where each vehicle requires acceleration and
speed of the platoon’s leader and the vehicle in front. Other
designs, with different characteristics, are possible [9], but do
not influence the maneuvers we focus on.
All protocols are implemented on top of standard broadcast
beacons transmitted at 10Hz as commonly required [12].
“Unicast” messages are obtained by identifying the intended
recipient at the application level, with a proper tagging in
messages, which however can be read by any other vehicle,
adding redundancy and reliability to the system.
The number of events that can interfere with platoon
maneuvering are humongous, but here we only consider the one
envisaged in the scenarios already described: the goal of this
work is verifying the feasibility of automatic maneuvering
controlled via a standard DSRC/WAVE vehicular network
environment in a mixed scenario, and we do not pretend to
make an exhaustive study.
We think that the scenarios we consider (Figure 1b) can
be very common in case of platooning cars, which travel
faster than trucks. Note that whether the truck is equipped
with communication devices or not is irrelevant: it will in
any case interfere with the maneuver. We want to explore if
implementing proper reactions to this situation, i.e., completing
the maneuver if the truck is far enough or abort it if the truck
is too close, is feasible and if the situations are distinguishable
with the on-board sensing (the radar).
There are other situations which can prevent the successful
termination of the maneuver, e.g., when an unauthorized human-
driven car enters the platoon, or when a network fault occur.
We addressed these problems but we intentionally omit them in
here, as the aim is mainly to show future research directions.
IV. JOIN APPLICATION PROTOCOL
Consider the JOIN maneuver, in particular with a car entering
in the middle of the platoon. Three vehicles are “actively”
involved in the procedure. The joiner M sends a join request
to the leader L, which replies back with the position at which
M is supposed to join. M then moves into position on one
of the two lanes adjacent to the platoon. When M is in the
position indicated by L, car F opens a gap to let M in. M
and F close their gaps and the procedure terminates.
All packets sent for notification, i.e., to perform state changes,
must be reliably transmitted at least to the vehicle that has the
active role in the maneuver. This is obtained including in the
broadcast beacons the identity of the intended recipient, which
will return an application layer acknowledgement enabling the
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Figure 2. State machines for the vehicles involved in a JOINMIDDLE maneuver.
No fault/misbehavior detection included.
detection of lost packets and possibly triggering retransmissions.
It is conceivable to achieve the same goal by using IEEE
802.11p unicast frames. This possibility, however, has the
drawback that the other cars do not receive this message, so
they miss part of the information about the maneuver status.
The state machines at the different vehicles that define this
JOIN protocol are shown in Figure 2. We only represent the
maneuver itself for the sake of clarity, without including all the
details to detect faults and impairments and the actions taken to
counter them: considering every possible fault or impairment
is more a task for a standard specification than for a proof-of-
concept prototype. In our implementation when the maneuvers
cannot be completed as intended, it is simply aborted, i.e., M
does not join the platoon. The ‘idle’ state corresponds indeed
to the steady state platooning for all the cars but M , which
until has received the positive join acknowledgement from
L remains human driven. At the end of the procedures all
car return to the steady state ‘idle’ platooning, thus for the
joiner M entering the ‘follow’ state of this procedure means
move to
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monitor
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ack
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Figure 3. State machine for the detection of a slow vehicle in front.
becoming a normal follower car.
We now extend the state machine to cope with the situation
in which M detects a vehicle in front while trying to get in the
correct position to join the platoon. This can happen during
the “move to position” and the “wait gap” statuses of the state
machine in Figure 2b. To handle this case we can extend the
state machine of M as shown in Figure 3, where the two states
enclosed in the dotted line are the same states of Figure 2b.
When M detects a vehicle in front, it first switches to the
“monitor” state. The radar can indeed detect objects which
are up to 200m to 300m distant, which do not immediately
interfere with the maneuver. Whenever a dangerous situation is
detected, e.g., the Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) is mandating
to decelerate to avoid a collision, then the maneuver is aborted.
Notice that being in the “monitor” state does not prevent
to continue the maneuver. If M is able to move to the join
position, and the vehicle in front does not endanger maneuver’s
safety, it can continue waiting for F to open the gap and, in
case, successfully complete the maneuver.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
For the protocol evaluation, we implemented it into the
platooning enabled extension of Veins [3] and test it the
aforementioned scenarios. To show the validity of our approach,
we implement anomaly detection mechanism connected to basic
countermeasure procedures. In particular, to detect the presence
of a slow vehicle in front, we exploit data obtained from the
radar, and compute the acceleration that the ACC would apply.
If the deceleration becomes greater than 3m/s2, then the system
issues a warning. The countermeasure connected to this warning
is to make the joiner M send an abort message to the leader,
disabling CACC and switching back to ACC.
We analyze the maneuver in the different scenarios from a
vehicle dynamics point of view. Plots in Figure 4 show the
dynamics of the vehicles in the platoon, plus the dynamics of
the joiner M . The figures plot the distance from the vehicle
in front as perceived by the radar.
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Figure 4. Vehicles dynamics for the different scenarios showing radar distance measured by car x.
We start with the analysis of Scenario 1 (Figure 4a). The plot
shows how the maneuver is correctly performed. The joiner
M approaches the platoon from the side, and when in position,
F and car 4 slow down to open a gap. The joiner M detects a
truck in front, as shown by the radar trace, but it is far enough
to let M in. The gap is then slowly closed, and the procedure
terminates.
In Scenario 2 (Figure 4b) instead, M reaches the join
position, F starts to open the gap, but M has to abort to avoid a
collision. At this time, M switches to ACC and remains behind
the truck, while F closes the gap and the platoon continues to
drive as before.
These results show how the protocol can be easily extended
to detect and react to anomalies in the procedure. Using
the same approach, we can develop the state machines for
other interferences, or for other maneuvers, analyze possible
weaknesses, and study how to tackle them.
VI. CONCLUSION – TOWARD A MODULAR APPROACH
This work has proposed and analysed an application level
protocol to support JOIN maneuver in two sample scenarios,
showing that relatively simple logic can support complex
maneuvers as letting a vehicle join a platoon in the middle
of the same, while guaranteeing that in case of interference
the maneuver can safely be aborted. The state machines of
Figure 2, however, do not handle all possible situations that
might occur, and as previously mentioned they need to be
extended. When including all possible kind of interferences
and network faults, state machines might become very large,
and thus their verification become difficult.
Consider the JOIN maneuver we described beforehand. We
can split it as follows: M performs a LANECHANGE followed
by a LARGEDISTANCEFOLLOW of the car in front of F , then F
should OPENGAP, M must JOINATBACK the first sub-platoon,
and F should finally CLOSEGAP. Now imagine that M wants
to leave the platoon. M and F should OPENGAP, M leaves
invoking LANECHANGE, and the platoon can continue after F
performs CLOSEGAP. Moreover, some of these sub-maneuvers
can further be split, e.g., JOINATBACK or OPENGAP. The
latter can be performed by combining LEADERCHANGE with
LARGEDISTANCEFOLLOW.
We think that the smaller is the procedure, the easier is its
design and its verification. Our future work thus includes a clear
definition of a basic set of maneuvers that can be composed
in order to perform more complex ones.
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Abstract—Future requirements for drastic reduction of CO2
production and energy consumption will lead to significant
changes in the way we see mobility in the years to come. However,
the automotive industry has identified significant barriers to the
adoption of electric vehicles, including reduced driving range
and greatly increased refueling times. The V-Charge Project,
funded by the European Commission, seeks to address these
problems simultaneously by developing an electric automated
car, outfitted with close-to-market sensors, which is able to
automate valet parking and recharging for integration into a
future transportation system. In this paper, we describe the
research challenges associated with providing a wireless Vehicle-
to-X (V2X) communication infrastructure for V-Charge-enabled
parking areas.
I. INTRO
As part of their “Europe 2020” program, the European
Commission has outlined a number of ambitious targets for
Europe to meet by the year 20201. These targets address a
wide range of social, environmental, and economic issues. Part
of the strategy is to address the problem of climate change, to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to move toward renewable
sources of energy, and to increase energy efficiency. One aspect
of this challenge will be the reduction in reliance on fossil fuels
and the move to electric motor vehicle transport. However,
the automotive industry has identified significant barriers to
the electrification of vehicles, including reduced driving range
and increased refueling times [1]. The European V-Charge
Project seeks to address these problems simultaneously by
developing an electric automated car, outfitted with close-
to-market sensors, which is able to automate valet parking
and recharging for integration into a future transportation
system. [2]
To illustrate the vision of V-Charge, we use the following
smart car system scenario: A traveling person seeks to catch a
flight, possibly having a tight schedule. At large transportation
hubs like airports, the process of finding comfortable parking
close to one’s departure terminal is usually quite cumbersome
and time-consuming. V-Charge improves this situation signifi-
cantly, allowing the driver to stop the car at a designated drop-
off zone in front of the terminal and to directly proceed to
the departure gate. Meanwhile, a back-end server, called the
V-Charge ParkingManager [3], which is in charge of the effi-
cient parking resource management, provides the vehicle with
relevant mission information, such as an assigned charging
station or parking spot, a map of the premises, etc., via Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications. These data allow the
1http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/targets/index
en.htm
Fig. 1. The initial experimental platforms for the V-Charge project.
vehicle to autonomously navigate and maneuver to its assigned
target destination. Similarly, when the driver returns, he can
remotely command the vehicle to the pick-up zone by issuing
an according request to the back-end using his smartphone.
This implies three major fields of research: (i) vehicle
functionality, onboard localization, detection of static and
dynamic obstacles, and on-board planning using only close-to-
market sensors, (ii) logistics, optimal scheduling of charging
stations and assignment of parking spots, and (iii) infrastruc-
ture, development of a secure and reliable communication
framework to store and share a database of information about
the parking area. [2]
This paper will present an overview of the research fields
(ii) and (iii) of the V-Charge project, with a focus on the
communications aspect. The experimental platform consists of
two VW Golf, shown in Fig. 1, which have been modified
to support fully automated driving using only close-to-market
sensors.
II. PARKING MANAGEMENT
Since the number of charging stations at large parking
areas, due to cost reasons, will be limited, the search for an
available (and charging-capable) parking spot will be typically
even more complicated and time-consuming for electric vehi-
cle (EV) drivers than for drivers of internal combustion engine
(ICE) cars. V-Charge therefore provides an automated parking
and charging system, based on a central back-end server which
is in charge of an efficient parking resource management. It
also provides each vehicle with relevant mission information
allowing it to navigate to its assigned target destination. Since
the developed management algorithms are generally applica-
ble, however, they are also beneficial for non-autonomous (e.g.,
human valet parking) or non-electric usage scenarios.
To enable this system functionality, two main contributions
to the management and infrastructure part of the project are
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made. First, the abovementioned concepts for efficient parking
management are developed. Based on driver requirements, e.g.,
prospective parking time, current battery charging level and
required travel distance, the V-Charge ParkingManager [4]
assigns (schedules) available parking resources, such as regular
parking spots and, in particular, scarce charging stations to con-
nected vehicles. Requirements for charging station scheduling
as well as a short overview of first evaluation results are given
in [5]. Several scheduling algorithms have been developed and
evaluated [3] in detail in a dedicated simulation environment,
considering different usage scenarios. For the simulation setup,
real-world parking statistics obtained from Hamburg Airport
and the City of Braunschweig, Germany, are used.
Second, a framework for V2I and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
(both terms are often subsumed as V2X) communications
is developed and described in Section III. This framework
enables the distribution of mission information to connected
vehicles. Mission information includes assigned charging sta-
tions or parking spots, a digital map of the premises with
marker and docking positions at charging stations, etc. Sensor
data aggregated by roaming and parking vehicles, e.g., road
conditions and parking occupancy (relevant in mixed-mode
scenarios), are transferred back to the server, where they are
merged with the central map. Further, the framework provides
global system monitoring and remote debugging. Of course,
state-of-the-art security and trust concepts are factored in, as
described in Section IV. Driver interaction (status check, drop-
off, pick-up) is realized via mobile user devices (smartphones).
In Section V, we show how to collect network connectivity in-
formation and how to use it for advanced parking management
decisions.
III. V2I COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE
All in-vehicle modules, such as sensors, localization and
on-board planning, share information in the form of broad-
casts or point-to-point connections using the Data Distribu-
tion Service (DDS) middleware. Therefore, we examined the
feasibility of exploiting the middleware on the wireless link
for V2I communications (as suggested in [4]). This would
afford a homogeneous protocol stack and possibly synergy
effects between project partners. Our evaluations, however,
have shown that in our usage scenarios, DDS on the wireless
link has some drawbacks such as lack of addressing specific
nodes, high overhead for implementing security, and lack of
multi-hop support. Thus, DDS will be used both on the vehicle
and server side, but not between them.
Instead, an efficient and powerful framework based on a
Delay-/Disruption-Tolerant Network (DTN) [6] is being devel-
oped for V2X communication. Because of the limited com-
munication range of wireless radios and the highly dynamic
structure of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), often
there is no end-to-end path between any two network nodes
willing to exchange data. DTNs overcome this intermittent
connectivity with a store-carry-forward approach and therefore
do not require stable links. In a DTN, messages are stored at a
node as long as there is no next hop available for forwarding
a message. The node carries the message along its way and
forwards it as soon as a new connection for forwarding
becomes available. Additionally, as an overlay network, DTNs
can bridge different network technologies (e.g., IEEE 802.11
V-Charge Server
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DDS
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Fig. 2. Mission control architecture. A disruption-tolerant network and the
DDS middleware are used for V2I and intra-component communications,
respectively.
and IEEE 802.15.4), ensuring information exchange across
network limits and thus reaching a larger set of potential
communication partners.
Although originating from interplanetary communications,
DTN seems more practical than DDS for the transmission
of mission-related traffic. For this purpose, we utilize IBR-
DTN2 [7], a lightweight and modular Bundle Protocol [6]
implementation. Due to the integrated routing modules, no
direct connection between the source and the individually
addressable sink of the data is required—the routes can be
determined dynamically. While assuming direct connections
between nodes in the parking lot as the default, vehicles or
stationary nodes can also be used as relay stations to extend the
network coverage, as described in Section V. Moreover, data
can easily be encrypted, but still be routed via other nodes. An
overview of the resulting communication architecture is given
in Fig. 2.
IV. V2I SECURITY
An interesting research challenge in the context of vehicu-
lar DTNs is the question how drivers can securely register their
vehicle with the V-Charge service and deploy keys for securing
V2I communications [8]. By means of a smartphone-based reg-
istration and key deployment process for V2I communications,
we are able to achieve a high degree of user independence
from third parties, since nobody but the owner (not even the
OEM) ever possesses the vehicle’s private key. Further, our
open and easily auditable protocol warrants user trust in the
underlying cryptographic principles. Although we propose a
solution aiming at the V-Charge project, our concepts are more
generally applicable. For instance, any vehicular cloud service
relying on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) could use the
same process, since we provide an application-independent
means for secure key deployment without entrusting the ser-
vice provider or a third party with the private key. Moreover,
the proposed solution is applicable to vehicles that come pre-
deployed with the required communication technologies as
well as refitted ones. Besides local ParkingManagers (PMs)
communicating securely with vehicles via DTN, the V-Charge
service consists of several central components: (a) the Cus-
tomerManager, (b) the Authorization Server, and (c) the DTN
Certificate Authority (CA).
(a) The CustomerManager [4] provides registration func-
tionality and all necessary service methods (pick-up, drop-off,
status checking) via RESTful Web services that are being inter-
faced by the V-Charge smartphone application. All methods of
2http://www.ibr.cs.tu-bs.de/projects/ibr-dtn/
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deploy(certp, certca )
p:ParkingManager ca:DTN CA
Fig. 3. Deployment of certificates issued for local ParkingManagers.
the interface are protected by the OAuth 2.0 standard [9]. (b) A
central OAuth Authorization Server handles all OAuth sessions
and provides verification methods. The connection between
smartphone and the RESTful Web services itself is secured by
SSL. (c) The DTN CA manages certificates deployed to all
participants in the DTN, i.e., PMs and vehicles.
As depicted exemplarily in Fig. 3, a public/private key pair
〈pkp, skp〉 is generated by each PM p. The DTN CA processes
p’s Certificate Signing Request (CSR) after it physically re-
ceived it from p and sends back an certificate certp signed
with the CA’s secret key skca . After certp has been deployed
on p, vehicles equipped with the DTN CA’s root certificate
certca can verify if Bundles are affiliated to a PM (i.e., signed
with skp) and are thus allowed to issue control commands
(i.e., drop-off, pick-up). For more details, the interested reader
is referred to [8].
V. CONNECTIVITY MAP
In order to allow the central parking management system
to efficiently and safely communicate with vehicles and to
send them to assigned parking spots and charging stations,
it is paramount to ensure that vehicles will not be sent to
areas of the parking area/garage where the reception of the
wireless signal is too weak or where there is no reception
at all, as we have previously described in [10]. Otherwise, a
vehicle sent to such an area might not be able to communicate
with the parking management system anymore and will thus
not be able to receive further mission commands—it would
require manual intervention to retrieve it. Further, depending
on the operational use case, there are extended requirements
to the communication link that go well beyond of what a
simple “reception/no reception” evaluation is able to achieve.
For instance, some use cases (emergency stop, operating data
monitoring, etc.) require a certain minimum Quality of Service
(QoS) level in terms of reliability, latency or throughput.
The concept of the Connectivity Map [11] is used to
meet these requirements. The basic idea is that vehicles in
the parking area perform measurements in terms of current
communication properties as a byproduct of V2I communica-
tions. The collected data, exemplarily depicted in Fig. 4, can
be transferred and stored on a central back-end, allowing the
estimation of the network characteristics for other vehicles.
Therefore, areas where the QoS requirements cannot be met
or where “white spots” occur can be determined in advance to
avoid them in future mission planning or to use the network
characteristics for sophisticated scheduling.
Fig. 4. Overlay heatmap of the RSS in an indoor scenario.
In the following, we will present some use cases for the
connectivity map which allows us to create a cost- and energy
efficient system.
A. Dynamic Optimization of Utilization of Infrastructure Com-
ponents
The installation of (wired) infrastructure for providing
network coverage of parking garages or large parking areas
near fairgrounds is quite cumbersome and expensive. Solar-
powered and battery-supported access points with a wireless
(directional) uplink can be used to simplify the installation.
Energy restrictions, however, require taking efficiency and
energy consumption into account. Options are to power those
nodes up only when they are absolutely needed or switching
between different links for communication, depending on the
application’s needs. For example, a radio with low energy
requirements, e.g., IEEE 802.15.4, may have a small (but in
some cases sufficient) data rate, while IEEE 802.11 can achieve
a higher throughput and larger communication range. For each
radio, power control settings should be used to ensure a stable
communication link while keeping the transmission power as
low as possible.
The PM [4] makes decisions on the vehicles’ positions
in the car park and thus has the possibility to position them
in a cluster, for instance, which allows wireless infrastructure
components in deserted areas to be kept powered off.
B. Multi-Hop
Data on the network quality like signal strength or band-
width sensed by vehicles in the parking area can be used to
collect real-time, real-life information on the network status.
Radio failures of single infrastructure components can be
detected and according countermeasures can be taken. For
example, a supervisor can be informed and the scheduling
modules can handle the area as a (temporarily) white spot and
navigate vehicles around the affected region.
In traditional V2I systems, vehicles in white spot areas
could not be addressed by the back-end. In our system,
however, the multi-hop features of the DTN software can be
used to establish a communication with those cars. Thus, they
can be requested to move to another parking spot with network
coverage, for example.
C. QoS-based Parking Management
In [4], it was shown how a parking management system can
accommodate different (and contradicting) user requirements
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such as estimated parking time, state-of-charge for electric
vehicles, etc. The Connectivity Map enables us to extend this
system by making advanced parking management and schedul-
ing decisions based on the abovementioned QoS requirements.
For parked vehicles, different QoS requirements can be
defined. If a user wants large amounts of data such as media
files or digital maps uploaded to his vehicle during the stay,
it should be parked in high throughput areas. When all data
transfers are finished, the car can be automatically moved in
order to free high-connectivity parking spots. At all times,
it has to be ensured that a basic connection to each vehicle
can be established. Using multi-hop communications, this may
be even ensured for white spots by adeptly parking vehicles
nearby and using them as relays. Overall, this approach enables
us to minimize infrastructure costs, e.g., Access Points (APs)
installations and maintenance effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an overview of research
challenges in the V-Charge project, with a focus on the
communications aspect. This includes a DTN-based V2X
communication architecture, that allows us to facilitate IBR-
DTN’s built-in features in order to increase the stability and
reliability of the wireless link. Moreover, security challenges in
the V-Charge system have been addressed. We have described
our vision of advanced parking management decision support.
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Abstract—The vehicular traffic in the cities is increasing every
year. The road infrastructure in many metropolitan areas is not
able to sustain the rush-hour traffic demand and the extension
of the road network cannot easily be done. There are some
solution proposed to improve the traffic situation, among them,
the optimization of the resources already available by means of
collecting real time Floating Car Data (FCD) from the vehicles
and use them to suggest dynamic routes in order to minimize
travel delays. The centralized infrastructure able to achieve this
goal has already been presented in ”Improving Traffic in Urban
Environments applying the Wardrop Equilibrium” (Codeca, L. et
al., 2013). In this extended abstract we present the decentralized
version of the system and the preliminary results of its evaluation.
Keywords—Intelligent Transportation Systems, Urban Traffic,
Traffic Flow Optimization, Wardrop Equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
The vehicular traffic demand in metropolitan areas is
increasing and the road infrastructure has often reached its
limit; alternative means of transportation will play a major
role in relieving traffic congestion, but it is likely that with the
economic growth and its flexibility requirements, the demand
for individual mobility must be taken into account.
The level of complexity of a model able to describe the
metropolitan environment is high due to its characteristic: short
road segments, different types of intersections, different types
of vehicles, pedestrians, and unexpected obstacles. In the past,
civil engineers, mathematicians and physicists proposed many
models to describe and analyse vehicular mobility [1] and [2].
In order to accommodate the growing traffic demand, we
propose to optimise the usage of the resources already avail-
able through a collaborative traffic management system. The
solution proposed in this paper is the extension of what has
been proposed in [3]. Several papers have recently proposed
methods for efficiently sensing traffic-relevant information,
among them [4], [5], and [6].
To optimize the resources already available, the participating
vehicles receive a dynamically adapted route to their desti-
nation based on the Real Time Traffic Situation (RTTS). In
this work the best route is defined in terms of the Estimated
Travel Time (ETT) from source to destination and is based
on the first Wardrop principle [7]. This principle is known as
the user-optimal equilibrium and provides the best solution for
each individual user.
The evaluation of the protocol is done by means of simulation
using well-known tools such as SUMO [8], OMNet++ [9]
and Veins [10]. In this work, to model the urban traffic
dynamics we use the Krauss car-following model [11] that
is implemented in SUMO.
II. WARDROP’S FIRST PRINCIPLE OF EQUILIBRIUM
In this work we apply the selfish user-centred policy
defined by Wardrop’s first principal of equilibrium [7]. In
case of network games based on congested transportation or
telecommunication networks, an accepted solution is provided
by the Wardrop equilibria. The first principle states that every
player selects a route that minimises the travel cost between
source and destination. We shall call Rs,d the set of all the
possible routes from the source s to the destination d and the
route chosen by the vehicle i as routei.
routeis,d = min(Rs,d).
Since users selfishly choose their routes to minimise their
costs, this principle is known as the user-optimal equilibrium.
It must be taken into account that the solution is not necessarily
system-optimal. Wardrops second principle is the one related to
the optimality of the whole system. It states that users minimise
the overall total travel time of the system. Due to the fact that
our aim is to find an efficient solution deployable in a city, the
selfish solution implies an immediate benefit for the single user
and thus increases the chance of a greater initial acceptance.
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The topology we used is a 10x10 Manhattan grid. Each
road segment measures 500 meters, has the same priority, and
has only one lane in every direction. Each intersection follows
the right-before-left priority rule, and deploys a 802.11 access
point. The architecture of the system is based on a Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication network in which the
vehicles in the monitored area communicate with a local
Traffic Coordination Point (TCP) using their On-Board Unit
(OBU). The communication protocol is the same as presented
in [3] and is divided in two parts, Information Beaconing and
Route Management. Both of these parts need to use a reliable
overview of the system.
Real Time Traffic Situation (RTTS): With RTTS we
refer to all the different data collected and aggregated to
estimate the traffic conditions. We use this information to
compute the user equilibrium and decide the best route for
a vehicle.
Information Beaconing: The participating vehicles
move through the road network, while the OBU collects the
traffic metrics (location, direction and speed) and sends them
every 60 seconds to the local TCP located at the intersection.
The TCPs aggregate these metrics dynamically to update the
RTTS.
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Fig. 1. Simulation scenario. 10x10 Manhattan grid topology with access
points on the intersections.
Route Management: The OBU sends the route request
containing the current location and desired destination to the
local TCP. The optimal route computed using the RTTS is
sent as a reply to the OBU. If the optimal route changes due
to varying traffic conditions, the OBU receives a route update.
The minimum delay route is computed using Dijkstra’s
shortest path algorithm [12] with dynamic edge costs using
as weight the Estimated Travel Time (ETT). The ETTs for a
road segment is computed using its length, ls, divided by the
average speed vs of all vehicles currently travelling along that
segment.
vs =
1
ns
ns∑
i=1
vi,
ETTs =
ls
vs
.
where ns is the number of vehicles on the segment and vi is
the velocity of the vehicle i. A route is composed of multiple
segments and its overall cost ETTr is obtained as follows:
ETTr =
mr∑
i=1
ETTsi .
where mr is the number of segments composing the route.
The minimum delay route mdr between the origin o and the
destination d is the one that minimises the ETT.
mdrio,d = min(ETTRo,d).
The mdrio,d is the route provided to the vehicle i from the
system.
IV. SIMULATION SETUP AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Simulation environment: To build the simulation envi-
ronment for this scenario we used Veins, a simulation frame-
work able to provide the bi-directional coupling mechanism
to link OMNet++ for the wireless network model, and SUMO
for the vehicular mobility model. SUMO provides different
mobility models, for all our simulations we use the Krauss car-
following model. Each trip has a source and destination chosen
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the average velocity of all the vehicle in the simulation
with external information.
at random among all the edges of the Manhattan topology and
the route for each trip is computed using duarouter, a tool
provided by SUMO that uses Dijkstra’s algorithm to choose
the path having the minimum cost. Here the cost is determined
by the length and priority of the segment.
Evaluation parameters: Based on the results obtained
previously [3], we fixed some parameters such as the beacon-
ing time and the route update to 60 seconds. The simulation
started with 10,000 vehicles and the aim was to measure the
time necessary to all of them to reach their destinations. For
every vehicle, we measured the average velocity.
In this work we evaluated the performances of the protocol
with different participation rate for the users and different
coverage of the intersection in terms of access points. We
compared the performances of it with two different sets of
information aggregated as the Real Time Traffic Situation
(RTTS). In the first scenario, the RTTS is computed using
the information collected form the OBU of the participating
vehicles, aggregated with external information provided by the
SUMO global knowledge. This can be motivated with the use
of external information sources such as inductive loops and
traffic cameras. In the second scenario, the RTTS is computed
using only the information collected form the OBU of the
participating vehicles.
Figures 2 and 3 show the average velocity in m/s for the
different participation rate of users and access point coverage
in the two different scenarios. In Figure 2 the RTTM used to
compute the user equilibrium contains external information.
By keeping in mind that the current number of finalized
simulations is not yet statistically representative, we can see
that the protocol is always improving the traffic situation when
external information is used to maintain the RTTM, and this
is true even with 25% of access point coverage. In Figure
3 the RTTM contains only the information provided by the
active users through the OBU; here we can see that if there
is no external information available, the coverage plays an
important role. Furthermore, with 80% or more coverage, the
performance is similar to the one with external information,
even with low user participation. When the coverage is 60%
45
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
0 10 25 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ve
loc
ity 
[m
/s]
Users participation rate [%]
Overall Average Velocity - RTTS with only OBU information
Access Pointcoverage
10%
25%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Fig. 3. Comparison of the average velocity of all the vehicle in the simulation
with information collected only through the active OBU.
less, the information collected is misleading, which results in
increasing the congestion instead of mitigating it.
This behaviour can be explained by the fact that when there
is no network coverage, the overview of the situation is
incomplete and the user equilibrium is computed with only
partial information. Further investigations are needed to fully
understand this phenomenon and how it can be avoided.
The use of heuristics to compute the RTTS could be used
mitigate the errors in absence of reliable information. Another
possibility is to use more sophisticated models to compute the
user equilibrium and the route updates. Finally, further investi-
gations are required to understand and explain the anomaly in
Figure 2 with 50% user’s participation, and 100% coverage.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented the preliminary results of
the decentralized version of a traffic management system to
coordinate vehicular flows in urban environments. It is based
on real time traffic information gathered by an On-Board Units
and transmitted via wireless network to the local Traffic Co-
ordination Point (TCP) for aggregation. The routing algorithm
is based on the first Wardrop principle and computes the
minimum delay route using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm
with dynamic edge costs. We evaluated the system using Veins,
on a 10x10 Manhattan grid topology.
The preliminary results show that using the proposed technique
increases the average velocity for a network coverage greater
than 80% and a user participation greater then 10%. In case
of partial coverage, the protocol fails to relieve congestion and
due to incomplete information it even makes it worse (possible
attacker scenario). This phenomenon requires further investi-
gations. Future work we will also consist in evaluating more
parameters such as average waiting per vehicle, number of
messages exchanged and number of route update per vehicle.
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